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STRATEGIC RETIREMENT REFORM: IDENTIFYING THE 







This project seeks to understand the changes in the decision-making process to stay or 
leave the military upon adoption of a defined contribution retirement system, and the 
potential implications of human capital that might follow. Multiple theses have been 
written regarding potential cost savings of a defined contribution plan and how a change 
of this nature could affect military personnel retention rates. This project differs from 
other research in the field in that we assume the Department of Defense will shift the 
retirement compensation away from a pension system and 20-year vesting of benefits in 
the near future. This report focuses on the decision-making process that service member’s 
use and the potential implications for the services that might follow under a DC plan and 
how that decision-making process might change. Specifically, we utilize the unfolding 
model of voluntary turnover to assess the decision-making process for military personnel 
and assess the potential impacts from a voluntary turnover, retention, and Human Capital 
Theory perspective.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
According to the Tenth Quadrennial Review on Military Compensation, the 
purpose of military retirement is: 
 to provide members and former members of the  nation’s 
uniformed services with a socially acceptable level of payment 
during their old age 
 to provide members with a retirement system that is competitive 
with those provided by the private sector and the federal civil 
service 
 to provide a force-shaping tool that offers an incentive for 
members to stay until 20 years of service and an incentive to leave 
thereafter, thereby providing promotion opportunities for younger 
members 
 to provide a pool of experienced military manpower that the nation 
can call on in time of war or national emergency to augment active 
duty forces1 
Although the specific eligibility requirements to qualify for military retirement 
have evolved over the years, the underlying aims of the previous four statements have 
changed little since the Hook Commission established the basis for the current retirement 
system in 1948. Over the past 64 years, the methods used to achieve the four aims of the 
retirement system have been studied by 11 federally mandated reviews of military 
compensation and numerous other governmental agencies and commissions. As the 
Department of Defense budget has become increasingly strained, calls for military 
retirement compensation reform have steadily grown in number and intensity. Prevailing 
wisdom indicates eventual retirement reform is inevitable, but the framework of the 
system is the subject of intense debate. Criticism of military retirement compensation 
varies widely, depending upon the point of view of the stakeholder, however, the Defense 
Business Board captured the consensus of the criticism in its 2011 report. The Defense 
                                                 
1 Department of Defense, Report of the Tenth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation 
(Washington, DC: Department of Defense, 2008), 7. 
 2 
Business Board described the current military retirement system as inflexible, unfair, and 
economically unsustainable in the current fiscal and economic environment.2   
A. BACKGROUND 
1. Brief History of the Military Retirement System 
The uniformed services can trace the origin of its military retirement system all 
the way back to August 3, 1861.3  The Act of 1861 provided for the voluntary retirement 
of officers from all service branches after 40 years of service with the concurrence of and 
at the discretion of the president of the United States. While this act provided the basis of 
a retirement system, it did not address how the system was to be administered. Congress 
attempted to standardize the retirement system via the Act of 1916. 4  The 1916 Act 
focused on two foundational principles which still exist in some form today. The first 
principles integrated the idea of a move up or move out promotion system that was 
selective in nature. The second principle established the formula by which much of 
military compensation was calculated up until 1980. It settled on a formula that would 
pay 2.5% of base pay for every year of service up to a maximum amount of 75% for a 30-
year career.5 
The first significant reform or change to the manner in which military retirement 
compensation was calculated resulted from the Defense Officer Personnel Management 
Act (DOPMA).6  DOPMA, enacted in September of 1980, changed the formula by which 
military retirement compensation is calculated. Prior to DOPMA, retirement 
compensation paid 2.5% of basic pay per year for up to 30 years. It also based those 
                                                 
2 Defense Business Board, Modernizing the Military Retirement System (Washington, DC: Defense 
Business Board, 2011), 2–3. 
3 Gibert, Jeffrey, A. “Reforming the Military Retirement System,” (Research Project, United States 
Army War College, 1999). DTIC (19990614 041). 
4 Ibid., 4. 
5 Ibid., 5. 
6 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, A Summary of Major Military 
Retirement Reform Proposals, 1976–2006, by Rex Hudson, (Washington, DC: Federal Research Division,  
2007), 6. 
 3 
calculations off of the last month of basic pay. Under DOPMA, the percentages did not 
change; however, instead of payments based on the last month of basic pay, the average 
of the highest three years of basic pay was used to determine retirement compensation. 
While the data are not entirely conclusive in every retirement case, the general consensus 
was the change to averaging three years of basic pay reduced retirement benefits 
throughout the force between 5 and 10%. 
Before 1986, the retirement administration of officer and enlisted personnel were 
kept separate. The enlisted personnel retirement system was established by congressional 
act in February of 1885 to include the voluntary retirement of Army and Marine Corps 
personnel. The baseline act was modified in 1889 to include Navy personnel, and again in 
1907 to include all branches of service.7  Since 1907, both officer and enlisted retirement 
compensation has been governed by one statute. 
The largest change to military compensation affecting all of the services was the 
result of the passage of the Military Reform Act of August 1986. The Military Reform 
Act introduced the REDUX retirement system. Prior to 1986, military retirement pay had 
been calculated based on DOPMA. The introduction of the REDUX system brought 
about significant changes. First, the baseline percentage of 50% of retirement benefits for 
20 years of service was changed to 40% of benefits for the same career length of 20 years. 
REDUX still allows a service member to earn the 75% retirement benefit for 30 years. It 
accomplishes this by adjusting the percentage value assigned for each year of service. 
Under DOMPA, each year of service was worth 2.5% of benefits. Under REDUX, each 
year up to 20 years is reduced from 2.5% to 2%; however, each year in excess of 20 is 
worth 3.5% rather than 2.5%. After 30 years of service, the service member would still 
enjoy 75% of benefits. REDUX instituted another important change. Cost of Living 
Adjustments (COLA) that were given annually were changed to allow them to grow and 
one percentage point less than the Consumer Price Index (CPI). It did include a onetime 
                                                 
7 Gibert, Reforming Military Retirement System, 6. 
 4 
upward adjustment at age 62. REDUX applied to all members who joined any branch of 
the armed service after on or after August 1, 1986.8   
Compulsory REDUX remained in effect until late 1999. Based upon support from 
President Bill Clinton’s administration to repeal REDUX, The National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) of fiscal year 2000 offered members two distinct retirement 
options. Service members were given the option to remain under the pre-REDUX 
retirement system and receive 2.5% of retirement benefits for each year of service, or 
they could opt to remain under the REDUX system and qualify for a cash payment of 
$30,000 payable at 15 years of service. 9   Since the effective repeal of compulsory 
REDUX in late 1999, no significant changes to military retirement compensation have 
been enacted. 
2. Current Military Retirement System 
The current military retirement system applies to all service members; however, 
three separate methods for calculating retirement compensation exist. The specific 
method used to calculate compensation depends upon the day when the service member 
began his active duty service. This day is called the Date of Initial Entry into Military 
Service (DIEMS). The DIEMS date once established never changes. The first of the three 
methods is called Final Basic Pay. The Final Basic Pay method applies to service 
members who joined the armed services before September 8, 1980. Under this method, 
retirement pay is calculated by taking the last month of basic pay, multiplying isit? by 2.5% 
for each full year served, and further multiplying by the number of years of service. 
Fractional years are added to the final totals by multiplying the fractional years by 1/12th 
for each fractional year.10  Thus, a military member who completes exactly 20 years of 
 
                                                 
8 Ibid., 7. 
9 Library of Congress, Major Military Retirement Reform Proposals, 9–10. 
10 U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, Military Retirement Reform: A Review 
of Proposals and Options for Congress, by Charles A. Henning, CRS Report XXXX (Washington, DC: 
Office of Congressional Information and Publishing, 2011), 3.  
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service will receive exactly 50% of their final months’ pay as retirement compensation. 
Cost of Living Adjustments, or COLA, are directly related to increases in the Consumer 
Price Index (CPI). 
The second method of retirement compensation calculation is named High-3. 
High-3 applies to all service members entering the armed services between September 9, 
1980, and July 31, 1986.   Under the High-3 method, retirement compensation is 
calculated by averaging the highest 36 months of a member’s basic pay throughout his 
career. That average is then multiplied using the same formula used to calculate 
compensation under the Final Basic Pay method.11  The annual cost of living adjustment 
is also indexed to the CPI. 
The final method of retirement compensation is REDUX. REDUX applies to 
service members who entered military service on or after August 1, 1986. REDUX 
currently encompasses two options. A member can choose to retire under the High-3 
system or opt for the REDUX system. The REDUX system retains the methodology of 
averaging the highest 36 months of basic pay. That average is multiplied by 2% for each 
complete year of service. Fractional years are accounted for in the same manner as Final 
Pay and High-3. An added component of REDUX is the Career Status Bonus (CSB). The 
Career Status Bonus is a $30,000 cash bonus payable after 15 years of service. Thus, a 
member opting for the REDUX system will receive a $30K cash bonus after 15 years of 
service. At 20 years of service, that member would be eligible for 40% of retirement 
benefits. Additional years above 20 years of service are credited at 3.5% per year. This 
change allows for a member to receive the same 75% retirement benefit for a 30-year 
career as a member retiring under the Final Pay or High-3 retirement systems.12  Cost of 
Living Adjustments to retirement pay are equal to the CPI minus 1 percentage point. 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 4. 
12 Ibid., 5. 
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B. PREVIOUS RETIREMENT COMMITTEES 
1. Hook Commission 
The Hook Commission of 1948 was the first study of military compensation. Its 
work was completed in late 1948, and its findings formed the foundation of the Career 
Compensation Act of 1949.13  This act established the military compensation that is 
largely in force today. The military retirement system created by the Hook Commission 
established immediate retirement benefits for enlisted personnel and officers after a 30-
year career. Officers retiring with between 20 and 30 years of service would receive 
retirement benefits upon reaching the age of 60, while enlisted personnel could draw 
benefits upon reaching the age of 50.14  In addition, the Hook Commission established 
the non-contributory aspect of military retirement. This aspect of the compensation 
system still exists today. 
2. Defense Officer Personnel Management Act 
The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980 (DOPMA) and the 
supporting Department of Defense Authorization Act of 1981 were responsible for the 
major military retirement reforms of the early part of the 1980s. While the introduction of 
the High-3 formula form computing retirement pay and the establishment of non-
disability retirement at 20 years of service were the major changes, these acts made 
several other significant changes to the military retirement system. DOPMA stipulated 
that no contributions were to be made by service members toward their own retirement 
benefits and that no military retirement trust fund need be established. Furthermore, 
reserve military retirement was aligned with active duty service retirement. The policies 
and administration of reserve retirement were not the same as active duty, however, 
DOPMA ensured active and reserve retirement components were governed by common 
law. Vesting of retirement benefits and recall of retired service members were also 
addressed by DOPMA. Under DOPMA reform, no vesting of retirement benefits 
                                                 
13 Department of Defense, Tenth Review Military Compensation, 54. 
14 Ibid., 55. 
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occurred until after 20 full years of creditable military service. Recall of retired service 
members was also authorized under DOPMA. Upon retirement, service members were 
placed on the Inactive Ready Reserve and subject to recall. Furthermore, DOPMA 
extended the authority of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) over retired 
members. This served to limit their activities post-retirement. 
3. Military Reform Act of 1986 (REDUX) 
The watershed military retirement compensation reform legislation was the 
Military Retirement Reform Act of 1986. This act is more commonly referred to as the 
REDUX Act due to the REDUX system of retirement it introduced. REDUX differs from 
the DMC, PCMC, Grace Commission, and Fifth QRMC because it was not a retirement 
proposal or study; however, its policies are the basis for the current retirement 
compensation system. To reiterate, REDUX reduced the baseline retirement benefit for a 
20 year career from 50% to 40%. It also partly decoupled the Cost of Living Adjustment 
from the Consumer Price Index by subtracting one percentage point. 15  Although, 
REDUX represented significant retirement compensation reform, it was also a cost 
cutting measure. By reducing the baseline benefit by 10 percentage points and by 
decoupling the COLA from the CPI, the annual cost to the government of military 
retirees was reduced by almost one-third as compared to pre-1980 costs.16  As such, it 
struck a balance between those who believed retirement compensation should be used as 
a force-shaping tool, and those who were primarily interested in cutting the government 
costs of military retirement. Still, many were not satisfied with REDUX and in late 1999, 
with support from the Clinton administration, REDUX was effectively repealed with the 
passage of the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act. 17   The NDAA allowed 
service members to choose to retire with the prior High-3 system of benefits or retain 
REDUX. REDUX was also augmented with $30,000 cash payment payable at 15 years of 
service. 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 10. 
16 Ibid., 11. 
17 Ibid., 12. 
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4. Tenth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation 
The Tenth Quadrennial Review of Military Compensation (Tenth QRMC) 
released its report on military retirement compensation in July of 2008. It was a 
comprehensive review of the entire compensation system to include health care and 
educational benefits. It was specifically tasked to address many of the long-held 
criticisms of the current retirement system. Specifically, it was designed to address the 
notion that the current system provided an incentive for members with 10–12 years of 
service to remain in the uniformed services, while providing members with 20 or more 
years of service incentive to retire and begin to draw benefits.18  The Tenth QRMC 
proposal combined concepts of a defined benefit plan and a confined contribution plan. 
Under the defined benefit component of the plan, members would receive 2.5% of 
retirement benefits for each complete year of service. Compensation would be calculated 
under the High-3 of basic pay. However, the vesting options and age a member could 
begin to receive benefits would change. Under the proposal submitted by the Tenth 
QRMC, retirement benefits would vest after 10 years of service. The panel reasoned this 
change aligned the military system with the bulk of civilian sector plans.19  The true 
retirement age also changes under the Tenth QRMC proposal. Service members 
completing a 20 year career would be eligible to draw benefits upon reaching the age of 
57. For members serving fewer than 20 years, the age adjusts upward to 60. The plan 
does allow for the immediate payment of benefits upon completion of 20 or more years; 
however, the benefit is reduced by 5 percentage points for each year the member is shy of 
age 57.20  The defined contribution component of the system is structured around the 
Uniform Thrift Savings Plan. It calls for the government to establish an account for each 
service member and contribute up to 5 percent of a member’s basic pay. This account 
would also vest at 10 years and provide members with benefits upon reaching their 60th 
birthday. The Tenth QRMC also provides for two special types of pay as part of its 
                                                 
18 Department of Defense, Tenth Review Military Compensation, 64. 
19 Ibid, 63. 
20 Ibid, 64. 
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compensation package. The first of these pays is called Gate Pay. Gate Pay rewards 
service members for reaching certain length of service milestones. It would be based 
upon a multiple of the member’s basic pay and is payable as soon as the member reaches 
the milestone. This addresses the criticism of the current system by allowing for more 
upfront compensation as opposed to waiting for the member to retire before receiving any 
benefits. The second special pay is Separation Pay. It is payable to eligible service 
members upon leaving the military. This pay is not directly related to retirement 
compensation, but it does offer members choosing to leave the service before full vesting 
of benefits to leave with some form of compensation. Nevertheless, due to the broad 
scope of the Tenth QRMC’s focus, it was included in the proposal. 
5. Defense Business Board 
In May of 2010, Secretary of Defense William Gates tasked the Defense Business 
Board to examine current military business operations, and identify policies and options 
to reduce overhead and streamline business operations. In July of 2011, the Defense 
Business Board (DBB) released their “recommendations to modernize the military 
retirement system.”21   The report arrived at its recommendations/findings after analyzing 
the origin and purpose of the military retirement system and compared it other types of 
retirement compensation in the public and private sector.    A full description of alternate 
retirement proposals is located in Appendix A. The DBB concluded that the current 
military retirement compensation system was unjustly suited to retain a force structure of 
sufficient quantity and quality of personnel. It further went on to state that the 
inflexibility of the current system with respect to full vesting of benefits led to a 
disproportionate amount of service members leaving the service between 20 and 25 years 
of service. In addition, the DBB concluded that the military retirement system is 
inherently unfair. Because only 15 percent of enlisted members and 47 percent of officers 
ever reach the 20 year of service milestone, a relatively small number ever receive 
                                                 
21 Defense Business Board, Modernizing the Military Retirement System (Washington, DC: Defense 
Business Board, 2011), 7. 
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retirement benefits as compared to the large number of people who actually serve time in 
the uniformed services.22 
The DBB recommended a significant military retirement system overhaul with 
changes to the vesting options and the addition of DoD contributions to the current Thrift 
Savings Plan account. These changes would be in addition to the current TSP accounts 
service members are eligible to establish and contribute portions of their military pay. 
The DBB also recommended a change to the vesting options currently in place. The 
current military system vests at 20 years of service. No retirement benefits are paid to 
members who do not complete 20 years of service. In addition, TSP contributions would 
be risk adjusted based on the type of jobs performed by the service member. Increased 
contributions for service in a war a zone or hardship tours would be established. Hard-to-
fill jobs across the force would be eligible for increased contributions or lower retirement 
ages. TSP payout options would also be flexible under the DBB plan. Payout options 
would range from lump sum to annuity payments with partial payouts for education and 
survivorship rights for dependents of military members.23 
The DBB notes in its report that one of the major reasons military retirement 
reform in necessary and advisable results from the fact the “cliff vesting” or vesting of 
military retirement at 20 years of service offers a service member little incentive to 
continue a military career past 20 years.24  As such, the board argues that without reform, 
service members would be given incentive to retire shortly after reaching 20 years of 
service. In many cases, the service would prefer to retain members past 20 years of 
service, especially in cases where members have significant technical training or when 
filling highly specialized jobs. As currently constructed, the military retirement 
compensation system does not provide a mechanism to entice members to continue their 
career past 20 years of service. Often, members reaching this milestone are weighing the 
transferability of their skills to the private sector and the relative certainty of retirement 
                                                 
22 Ibid., 26–30. 
23 Ibid., 32. 
24 Ibid., 27. 
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benefits when making their decision. In fact, the ability to receive retirement benefits 
immediately upon retirement often pushes service members to retire vice continuing their 
service. Without reform, commanders are powerless to use the lure of additional 
retirement benefits to target specific skills sets and jobs for retention. 
C. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
With the ever-increasing scrutiny of the Department of Defense Budget and the 
focus on military retirement reform, it is a virtual certainty military retirement 
compensation reform will be instituted. While any type of retirement reform is certain to 
impact military retention, the impact of retention on the overall force structure is not 
completely captured by simple retention rates. The retention rate represents just one of 
the many effects resulting from a change of this type. To truly understand the full effect 
of a fundamental change of military retirement, it is important to study the process and 
factors that impact the decisions military officers make about continued military service. 
In order to completely model the potential impact of decisions of this type, factors 
affecting voluntary employment turnover and Human Capital Theory must be considered. 
Without considering these important factors, any personnel model would be incomplete 
and could lead to the unnecessary loss of experienced personnel from both the enlisted 
and officer ranks. This would lead to negative structural and relational capital loss effects 
felt throughout the armed services.25 
D. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This professional report endeavors to answer the following research question: 
What model, if any, do military officers use to decide when to terminate military service 
and how does retirement policy affect that model?  Secondary questions these report 
attempts to answer are: 
 What are the implications to the military services are associated 
with adoption of a defined contribution military retirement system? 
                                                 
25 Massingham, Peter, Measuring the Impact of Knowledge Loss (Los Angeles: Sage Publications, 
2008), 5. 
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 What organizational policies are necessary to mitigate the risks of 
associated with changing DoD retirement policy? 
E. LIMITATION AND SCOPE 
The military retirement benefit is continuously cited as a reason many service 
members make a career of out of service in the armed forces. It is also universally cited 
as a key factor of retention. Retention rates are certainly an important consideration when 
considering how to change the military retirement system; however it is not the focus of 
this report. This report assumes retirement compensation will change and that retention 
rates will also change to some degree. This report attempts to discover or clarify the 
process and factors by which military officers choose to continue their service. It also 
attempts to uncover other factors or issues stemming from a potential change in military 
retirement policy that have not been previously discussed. These are referred to a 
secondary effects or unintended consequences. Often the cumulative effects of these 
unintended consequences combine to outweigh the primary reasons behind the decision 
to implement change in the first place. This report attempts to identify and capture these 
effects through focus groups and present them as potential additions to any model we 
may develop. However, we realize that any effects we discover may ultimately not be 
definitive. 
F. SIGNIFICANCE OF STUDY 
The value of the pursuit of answers to our primary research question and its 
associated questions lies in the ability to identify the often unintended consequence of 
implementing a significant change in an organization. Should the Department of Defense 
enact the majority of the reforms recommended by the DBB, it would represent the most 
significant change to the military retirement system since August 1986 with the 
implementation of the Military Reform Act. Depending upon the implementation of such 
as change, attitudes regarding the value of a career of military service by those internal 
and external to the uniformed services may change. As such, there is value in identifying 
and attempting to mitigate any potential difficulties arising from a decision of this 
magnitude. This would allow the services latitude to ready contingency plans to mitigate 
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any risks to overall force structure. In addition, the opportunity to survey enlisted and 
officer personnel spanning all services to obtain their views on the value of 
organizational knowledge loss and military retirement reform allows for direct feedback 
from the force. This direct feedback is often lacking when decision makers are 
contemplating changes that affect the entire force. Regardless of whether the feedback is 
positive or negative, it is true feedback. Furthermore, as the force transitions after the 
wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, the opinions of a representative sample of the force is 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter is a review of the literature that has been conducted regarding 
military retirement, voluntary turnover, and knowledge retention. The previous chapter 
discussed heavily the background on the basic structure of the system as codified in 
1949, 26  and identified several groups commissioned to explore reforms of military 
compensation of which retirement is a large part. Those studies will not be discussed in 
this section, as we will focus on analysis and models developed by outside scholars.27  
B. MILITARY RETIREMENT LITERATURE 
1. Retirement Reform Analysis 
Military retirement has been analyzed and criticized many times over the past 60 
years. Several proposals have been brought forth by various commissions and retirement 
system reviews. Robert Goldich summarized eight proposals in the 10 years from 1969 – 
1979 in his 1983 work.28  He outlined several criticisms of the system still observed 
today but also noted that many of the criticism are biased toward “American civilian-
oriented, utilitarian approach to war and military affairs, rather than a more specifically 
military, geopolitical, and strategic”29 bias. He further concluded: 
The major identifiable conceptual underpinning for military non-disability 
retirement reform and supporting analysis consist of tacitly or explicitly equating military 
service with civilian employment, and of the military as an organization with civilian 
business or commercial enterprises.30 
                                                 
26 Robert L. Goldich, “Military Nondisability Retirement Reform, 1969–1979: Analysis and Reality,” 
Armed Forces and Society 10, no. 1 (1983): 64. doi: 10.1177/0095327X8301000103. 
27 Please note that many of these scholars also worked for defense think tanks tasked by DoD such as 
RAND and CNA. 
28 The overview of these eight proposals can be seen at Goldich, “Retirement Reform,” 62–64. 
29 Goldich, “Retirement Reform,” 60. 
30 Ibid., 73.  
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Indeed, much of the retirement reform talk has been over cost reductions and 
efficiency gains; two ideas harped on in the civilian business world that do not fit well 
with the military world accomplish the mission at an all-costs attitude. During wartime, 
costs are secondary to winning and staying alive. 
Further calls for reform also appeared in 1985 from Martin Binkin.31  He argued 
that need for a more effective force is more important than even the large and growing 
retirement costs. Technological innovation and sophisticated weapon systems call for a 
more intelligent and experienced force than past forces which relied heavily on “youth 
and vigor.”32 Technology is even more advanced now with the advent of the Internet, and 
telecommunications capabilities that allow constant monitoring and communication 
capabilities. These technologies take years to learn, and even longer to truly master their 
intricacies. Yet the current system with 20year vesting creates a huge incentive to retire 
right at 20 years when the experience gained over a career would be most useful.   
This idea was highlighted by Klopfer33 who stated that 20 years “coincides with 
the height of capability and expertise.”  His work argued that the system needs a 
completely new design that would be better for DoD and the individual service members. 
A contributory system modeled after the Federal Employees Retirement System (FERS) 
would allow this. 
2. Models 
Analysis of the retirement system cannot be done without analyzing the entire 
military personnel and compensation system as a whole. Retirement policy and changes 
to it affect overall personnel compensation which in turn impacts retention. 
Several models have been developed to analyze retirement reform effects on the 
military force structure. These models attempt to forecast changes in retention given 
                                                 
31 Martin Binkin, “Military Pensions: The Need for Informed Reform,” The Brookings Review. 3, no. 
3 (Spring, 1985): 8–15.  http://www.jstor.org/stable/20079877. 
32 Ibid., 8. 
33 Mathew Klopfer, “Charting a Course Away from the Pension,” Proceedings Magazine, August 
2011, http://www.usni.org/magazines/proceedings/2011–08/charting-course-away-pension. 
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changes in military personnel policy. Gotz and McCall developed a cost of leaving model 
termed the present value cost of leaving (PVCOL) model.3435  That model was further 
developed by John Warner in 197936 who added a taste variable to it. He further used the 
model to analyze three separate retirement proposals suggested by past compensation 
committees. All three plans were analyzed to predict retention patterns for each of the 
services.37  The ACOL model was further used to “evaluate the relative efficiency” of the 
system in 1984 with two proposals for reform.38  The analysis revealed a similar force 
size and shape at reduced cost to the government. The authors also postulated that one of 
these two systems might “improve overall personnel management…by reducing the 
dominance of the retirement system in the overall military compensation system.”39 
Problems with retirement reform were also identified for how to actually get one of the 
plans implemented. One was Congress and the other resistance from within the 
military.40 Warner agreed with this notion and stated “one source of resistance to change 
of course would come from within the military, where the current retirement system 
seems almost sacrosanct. But the more important source of resistance to change lies 
within the fact that they offer little prospect of near term savings.”41  Indeed any plan 
adopted would raise costs in the near term which isn’t very palatable in our current fiscal 
environment. 
                                                 
34 Glenn Gotz and John J. McCall, “The Retirement Decision: A Numerical Analysis of a Dynamic 
Retention Model,” WN-9628-AF, The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California, March 1977. 
35 PVCOL was termed by John Warner in his 1979 work on alternative military retirement systems. 
36John T. Warner, Alternative Military Retirement Systems: Their Effects on Enlisted Retention. 
Alexandria, Virginia: Center for Naval Analaysis, September 1979. DTIC (ADA084805). 
37 Results of the model can be viewed in Warner, Alternative Military Retirement Systems, Appendix 
B, 1–13. Appendix A includes actual retention statistics for 1977 as a comparison. 
38John H. Enns, Gary R. Nelson, and John T. Warner, “Retention and Retirement: The Case of the U.S. 
Military.” Policy Sciences 17, no. 2: 101–121. Business Source Complete, EBSCOhost (16854177). 
39 Ibid., 114. 
40 A common theme with all reform proposals is they are seen as reductions in benefits, and thus 
senior military staff are heavily reluctant to endorse any type of reform. 
41 Enns, Nelson, and Warner, “Retention and Retirement,” 114. 
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The dynamic retention model (DRM) 42  was developed by Gotz and McCall 
specifically to model Air Force officer retention. This model significantly improved over 
past models as it was “designed to estimate voluntary retention rates under a broad range 
of compensation, retirement, and personnel policies.”43  The model “eliminate several 
types of systematic prediction errors”44 observed with the PVCOL and ACOL models 
and has the ability to handle many policy changes at once. One drawback to the model is 
it requires much “more data than simpler models.”45 
Arguden researched and evaluated the adequacy of the ACOL, PVCOL, and 
DRM for retirement policy analysis.46 He was able to quantify their limitations, suggest 
possible improvements, and developed “a simulation methodology to test the 
improvements.”47  He concluded that the DRM was “the most theoretically sound”48 
while the others exhibited several biases. Of note the ACOL model was said to “under 
predict the effects of retirement policy changes on retention rates.”49   Arguden also 
highlights some general lessons when analyzing retirement reform using these models: 
(1) explicitly laying out the assumptions of the theoretical model and the 
estimation procedure is essential in understanding and using econometric 
models, and in ensuring internal consistency; (2)  not doing so can lead to 
significant prediction errors; (3)  a theoretically superior model is not 
necessarily the best one to use for policy analysis because estimation of its 
parameters can be very difficult, and simpler models may be able to 
approximate the complex models (and the real world) closely enough for 
analysis of many policies; (4)  a theoretically rigorous and consistent view 
                                                 
42 Glenn Gotz and John J. McCall, A Dynamic Retention Model for Air Force Officers: Theory and 
Estimates. Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, December 1984. DTIC (ADA149736). 
43 Gotz and McCall, A Dynamic Retention Model, 1. 
44 Ibid., v. 
45 Ibid., 64. 
46 R. Yilmaz Arguden, Personnel Management in the Military: Effects of Retirement Policies on the 
Retention of Personnel, Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, January 1986: DTIC 
(ADA166909). 
47 Ibid., iii. 
48 Ibid., vi. 
49 Ibid., viii. 
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of the world is essential in understanding the limitations and applicability 
of different approximations to reality (models).50 
Similar findings appeared in Trumble and Flanagan’s work on the feasibility of 
the ACOL model. 51   The study agreed with Arguden on using simulation to model 
retirement, and also pointed out that retirement pay analysis should be done with a DRM 
vice the ACOL model. 
Asch and Warner52  built on the theoretically sound DRM by adding several 
variables to model “microeconomic issues of effort supply and ability sorting.”53  They 
developed A Theory of Military Compensation and Personnel Policy that married 
“military compensation and retention with the emerging economic literature on 
compensation and incentives in large, hierarchical organizations.”54  Their model could 
then be used to identify the impacts on retention from retirement reform, but also on what 
those reforms would mean for effort put forth by personnel. To that aim four problems 
were identified with the system as it pertains to ability of personnel and effort supply: 
 It creates and implicit contract problem: The services appear to 
“demand” large numbers of mid-career personnel because the 
personnel are there and will not quit, and separating them prior to 
year of service (YOS) 20 would be viewed as unfairly breaking an 
implicit-contract. The services are therefore constrained to retain 
personnel who would not be retained were the terms of separation 
different. 
 Since the reward for an intermediate-length career is low, 
personnel must decide early on whether they want to be long-term 
careerists or leave. Some personnel who might have stayed longer 
under an alternative system leave very early.  
                                                 
50 Ibid., 147. 
51 David Trumble and Deborah Flanagan, Feasibility Study to Update Annualized Cost of Leaving 
(ACOL) Procedures at the Navy Personnel Research and Development Center (NPRDC), Oak Ridge, 
Tennessee: Oak Ridge National Laboratory, December 1990. doi: 10.2172/6214536. 
52 Beth Asch and John T. Warner, A Theory of Military Compensation and Personnel Policy, Santa 
Monica, California: RAND (1994). DTIC (ADA288654). 
53 Asch and warner, Military Compensation, xiv. 
54 Ibid., 2. 
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 Third, the midcareer “bulge” slows down promotion opportunities 
for younger personnel and blunts the rewards to “fast-trackers,” 
i.e., high-ability people who should move up more quickly. 
 Finally, although the system effectively skews the pay system for 
younger personnel who are still trying to advance, it reduces 
skewness for those who are vested and may thereby diminish their 
effort and advancement incentives.55 
Asch and Warner used their theory and model to analyze several alternative 
policies recommended by various commissions.56  He concluded that the model was 
“capable of replicating the Army’s enlisted and officer forces” 57  and that “the 
responsiveness of retention to changes in pay is consistent with estimates from 
econometric studies of retention.”58  Band-aid vesting59 and reduction of vesting time to 
15 years both yielded negative results with increased costs, less productive work force, 
and ineffective force structure. Warner also analyzes a system with separation pay and 
old age annuity finding that the separation pay could be used as a force management tool 
allowing to target what specialties need higher retention. However, pay raises would be 
needed to maintain a capable military force and overall costs would remain about the 
same. The results are also dependent on what sets of assumptions are used for the future.   
C. VOLUNTARY TURNOVER 
The models mentioned above were developed in an attempt to measure the impact 
on personnel retention, given some exogenous shock such as a policy change. However, 
they don’t take into account what causes personnel to leave in the first place. The models 
have been used as a tool to predict the impacts on retention (or the level of turnover), not 
the cause. There is a vast amount of literature on the subject of voluntary turnover, but 
little as it applies to the military. The military has an extremely high turnover rate with 
                                                 
55 Ibid, xvi-xvii. 
56 Beth Asch and John T. Warner, A Policy Analysis of Alternative Military Retirement Systems, Santa 
Monica, California: RAND (1995). Proquest (1994–1211120). 
57 Ibid., 71. 
58 Ibid., 71. 
59 Ibid., 45. 
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close to 50% leaving after a first term. Only 17% of all service members stay long 
enough to retire and collect benefits.60    
Previous works on turnover have centered around two main concepts: job 
satisfaction and job alternatives as antecedents to turnover. 61   Mobley developed an 
intermediate linkages model which described several links between job dissatisfaction 
and eventual turnover, and highlighted the “psychological process”62 of these links that 
further researchers could test. Steers and Mowday summarized several works and 
generalized these linkages into a three steps sequence noting the sequence could differ 
across employees. Hulin et al. “recognized that job alternatives and satisfaction could 
have substantially different effects on employee turnover across various populations.”63 
So job satisfaction might have a direct effect on one type of employee, but not on another. 
The key here is that while much research has been done “the research on the traditional 
models has explained only a modest proportion of variance in actual employee 
turnover.”64 
Many of the studies of turnover in a military context have centered on traditional 
models. For instance Holt and company65 pointed out “studies examining turnover in a 
military context have been grounded in the idea that systematic evaluations are made by 
members’ job satisfaction, commitment, and job-search behaviors are central to these 
decisions to leave.”66  Holt also pointed out that “traditional models are narrowly focused 
on rational, systematic evaluations of the current job and how specific job attitudes 
                                                 
60 Defense Business Board, “Modernizing the Military Retirement System,” (Report, Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., July 21, 2011): 8. http://dbb.defense.gov/reports2011.html. 
61 Thomas W. Lee and Terence R. Mitchell. “An Alternative Approach: The Unfolding Model of 
Voluntary Employee Turnover.” The Academy of Management Review 19, no. 1 (1994): 51–89. Proquest 
research library (00814614). 
62 Ibid., 53. 
63 Ibid., 54. 
64 Ibid., 56. 
65 Daniel T. Holt, Michael T. Rehg, Jeffrey H.S. Lin, and Jennifer Miller, “An Application of the 
Unfolding Model to Explain Turnover in a Sample of Military Officers.” Human Resource Management 46, 
no. 1 (Spring 2007): 35–49.  Proquest (2007–03432–004). 
66 Ibid., 37. 
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trigger one’s withdrawal decision.”67  As well, the current retention models discussed 
above are based on rational decision making and the ability to accurately quantify 
cost/benefit’s. 
Lytell and Drasgow 68  examined military turnover rates using event history 
analysis. Their models showed several predictors of turnover to include “background 
variables, military satisfaction, organizational commitment, withdrawal intentions, job 
withdrawal, and comparisons of military and civilian work and lifestyles.”69  Of these 
predictors, “withdrawal intentions, job withdrawal, organizational commitment, and 
military tenure consistently predicted voluntary turnover.”70  Where many past studies 
treated turnover as a “binary event”71, this study treated turnover as dynamic to see when 
turnover occurs as well as what might predict it. Retention models have attempted to 
capture military satisfaction and comparison of military and civilian work lifestyles, both 
of which are not very good predictors of turnover, and thus won’t be good at predicting 
retention.72 
Lee and Mitchel broke from the traditional view and developed the unfolding 
model of voluntary turnover. There model suggests that “existing models are too 
simple” 73  and don’t adequately explain employee decisions to stay or quit an 
organization. They argue that employee turnover is a complex process whereby “people 
follow one of four psychological and behavioral paths when quitting.” 74   Where 
                                                 
67 Ibid., 37. 
68 Lytell, Maria C. and Fritz Drasgow. ““Timely” Methods: Examining Turnover Rates in the U.S. 
Military.” Military Psychology 21, no. 3 (2009): 334. doi:  10.1080/08995600902914693. 
69 Ibid., 334. 
70 Ibid., 334. 
71 Ibid., 335. 
72 The taste variable is used in both the ACOL and DRM models and can be seen as a surrogate for 
military satisfaction. They also both make comparisons between military and civilian earnings, which 
doesn’t necessarily equate to work lifestyle. See Warner, Military Retirement Systems, and Gotz and 
McCall, Dynamic Retention Model. 
73 Lee and Mitchel, “An Alternative Approach,” 84. 
74 Thomas W. Lee, Terence R. Mitchell, Brooks C. Holtom, Linda S. McDaniel, and John W. Hill. 
“The Unfolding Model of Voluntary Turnover: A Replication and Extension.” Academy of Management 
Journal 42, no. 4 (1999): 450–462. Proquest (01877590). 
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traditional research had little impact on explaining turnover decisions, the unfolding 
model was able to explain a good portion of decisions to quit. In 1996, Lee and company 
applied the unfolding model and found that the four paths described by the model 
described 63%75 of the sample, a vast improvement over previous works. An update to 
the model was presented in a 1999 piece by Lee, Mitchell, Holtom, McDaniel, and Hill. 
This work presented several modifications to the existing model which increased the 
classification of job leavers by 30.1%.76 
The unfolding model was applied to the military by Holt, Rehg, Lin, and Miller in 
200777. Holt et al. pointed out that there are “fundamental differences between military 
service and civilian employment” so they added two additional decision paths. The 
original model accounted for 53% of turnover, while the revised model accounted for 
83% of the decisions to leave. 
D. KNOWLEDGE RETENTION 
1. Knowledge Retention Strategies  
Knowledge retention strategies and techniques have gained considerable attention 
in recent years as the realization of an aging baby boom generation set to begin retiring 
will have tremendous impacts on organizations human capital stores. It can be defined as 
the procedures developed and implemented to mitigate knowledge loss. Entire books 
have been written on the subject to educate managers and decision makers on the subject. 
Delong posits that “knowledge retention consists of 3 activities – knowledge acquisition, 
storage, and retrieval.”78  “Knowledge acquisition describes the practices, processes, and 
routines used to move knowledge into a state where it is kept available for future use.”79  
An example of this would be a senior officer mentoring a junior on leadership techniques, 
                                                 
75 Ibid., 451. 
76 Ibid., 458. 
77 Holt et al., “Application of the Unfolding Model,” 58. 
78 David W. Delong, Lost Knowledge: Confronting the Threat of an Aging Workforce, (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2004), 23. http://site.ebrary.com/lib/nps/Doc?id=10103670. 
79 Ibid., 23. 
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or a non-commissioned officer (NCO) instructing a class on technical aspects of a 
specific military occupational specialty (MOS).  “Storage represents the processes and 
facilities used to keep knowledge and information until it is needed.”80 For instance many 
of our strategies and doctrine are written down and published for new officers and 
enlisted personnel to read and understand. Retrieval includes behaviors, routines, and 
processes used to access and reuse information and knowledge in new situations, such as 
searching an expert database, calling colleague, remembering a past experience, 
brainstorming with a group about past experience, or searching a document database.”81  
There have been several attempts at this within the military service such as the Center for 
Army Lessons Learned (CALL) and Marine Corps Center for Lessons Learned. 
Similarly, Liebowitz has also published a great amount of work on knowledge 
retention. In his 2009 book Knowledge Retention: Strategies and Solutions82 he describes 
four pillars to knowledge retention: 
 Recognition and reward structure: making it part of everyday life 
 Bidirectional knowledge flow:  learning from your elders and from 
your juniors 
 Personalization and codification:  looking at the connections and 
collections 
 The golden gem:  bringing back the golden talent 
Several techniques are also presented in his work, some of which have already 
been adopted by several of the services. After action reviews83 are conducted after every 
additional duty trips, or big exercises such as Mojave Viper. Oral histories and 
storytelling84 are another knowledge retention technique used for years in the services. 
For instance the Navy and Marine Corps frequently tell “sea stories” about past 
                                                 
80 Ibid., 24. 
81 Ibid., 24. 
82 Jay Liebowitz, Knowledge Retention: Strategies and Solutions, (Boca Raton: Auerbach 
Publications, 2009), 26. 
83 Ibid., 23. 
84 Ibid., 23. 
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experiences aboard ships and deployments. These techniques can be quite affective at 
transferring knowledge throughout the organization. 
Parise, Cross, and Davenport looked at knowledge retention strategies by certain 
network roles.85  The three key network roles within an organization are the central 
connector, broker, and peripheral Player86 each requiring different strategies to increase 
knowledge retention. For instance central connectors often have key relationships 
allowing knowledge to transfer throughout the organization so using “personal network 
profiles in career development…to create network redundancies” would be a potential 
course of action.87  The peripheral player often has external relationships vital to the 
organization so a technique for retaining his/her knowledge would be rewards for 
“bringing in external ideas and connections.” Personnel within the services make many 
contacts, especially when working in a joint environment, which can be used to increase 
our knowledge stores. 
Droege and Hoobler also found strategies to help in knowledge retention. They 
posited that 1) tacit knowledge can be preserved, in part, when firms promote employee 
interaction, collaboration, and diffusion of non-redundant tacit knowledge, and 2) 
characteristics of a firms social network, including density and an optimal mix of weak 
and strong ties, promote interaction, collaboration, and non-redundant tacit knowledge 
diffusion.88 
2. Consequences of Knowledge Loss 
Much of the work on knowledge retention has focused on strategies and solutions; 
however, less work has been done on the potential impacts from knowledge loss. Starke, 
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Dyck, and Mauws studied the impacts of knowledge lost when an indispensable 
employee (IE) left the organization.89  They found that a great deal of tacit knowledge 
flowed from the IE to other employees which provided a safety net for others as the IE 
could help prevent mistakes.   
Eucker90 attempted to convey what impacts might be felt from tacit knowledge 
loss. He argued that knowledge is a function of information, experience, and context.91  It 
is the experience and context that makes tacit knowledge so important and the loss of 
someone with those two attributes would be devastating. For instance, he gives the 
example of a fireman and crew running into a burning building and when the situation 
doesn’t look or feel right the commander evacuated his men just before the house 
collapsed. The idea here is the commander large tacit knowledge stores from experience 
and context and was able to recognize when a situation was turning very dangerous. 
Without the experience and context a much worse outcome could have occurred, a 
potentially deadly impact. This particular case is similar to many service men and women 
who have built up vast amounts of tacit knowledge from fighting in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Increased turnover of these people could potentially cause DoD to lose vast amounts of 
knowledge that could be applied to our next battles.   
However, there is evidence that the potential loss of knowledge will be less 
dramatic than thought. The skills and knowledge acquired by personnel within DoD can 
be considered firm specific; many skills are “idiosyncratic and therefore useless at other 
firms.”92  In their work on the portability of stars performance, Groysberg and Lee found 
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that “The performance of an outstanding worker is not owned by the worker alone; it is a 
property of the worker/firm combination, and encompasses firm specific human capital 
embedded in colleague relationships and firm capabilities.”93  Given this relationship it is 
safe to assume that not all the knowledge and skills would be lost given increased 
turnover, because much of it is embedded in the institutions, culture, and relationships 
established through years of service. Since the Military and DoD in general emphasize 
teamwork to such a high degree, the loss of high quality personnel doesn’t lead to a one-
for-one decrease in the knowledge base. 
Droege and Hoobler94 looked at tacit knowledge diffusion and employee turnover 
and found a link between the two and that “social networks explicate the connection 
between employee turnover and tacit knowledge loss.” 95   They found that “tacit 
knowledge loss…stands to disadvantage firms with high employee turnover.”96  Indeed, 
the military can be characterized as having high employee turnover, with close to 50% of 
personnel leaving after the first 4 year term, and only 17% of all who join making it to 
retirement.97   
Schmitt and company98 sought to develop a model for knowledge retention during 
employee downsizing, a popular form of cost cutting over the last couple of decades. 
They made several arguments that downsizing “affects organizational factors such as 
organizational routines, procedures and culture.”99  Effects on the firm was not just seen 
in the financial numbers, but also in many non-financial measures not captured such as 
“erosion of skills, disrupted organizational networks and survivors negative response 
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behavior. Survivors often feel increased job dissatisfaction and organizational 
commitment,100 two factors that are part of the turnover process as defined by Lee.101  
Nicholas Scalzo studied the effects of knowledge retention during radical change 
initiatives,102 such as military retirement reform. He found nine themes which emerged 
from the data. Some of these themes were positive such as employees began seeking out 
information from multiple staff members, and the firm wasn’t handicapped as much of 
the knowledge still existed within the organization. These findings are also supported by 
Starke,103 who found that the organization he was studying didn’t lose any significant 
production capability. Some of the knowledge lost could be obsolete, allowing new 
knowledge to gain in the firm and allow new ideas to emerge.   
Finally, Massingham 104  developed a model for measuring the impact of 
knowledge loss by examining the impacts through an intellectual capital lens. His 
findings showed 1) lost human capital may produce decreased organizational output and 
productivity, 2) lost social capital may reduce organizational memory, 3) lost structural 
capital may diminish knowledge flows, and 4) lost relational capital may produce 
disrupted external knowledge flows.105  Several of these finding have been suggested in 
past studies such as lost organizational output and productivity.106 
Much has been studied regarding retirement reform, voluntary turnover, and 
knowledge retention. Our main contribution is to bring these areas of research together 
and identify what changes in the retirement system would have on turnover and 
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subsequently knowledge stores. To date, many works have been done each subject, but 
none bring them together. 
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A great deal of thought and effort was spent determining the optimal method to 
gather data to answer the primary research questions. The basic research questions are:  
 What process do military officers use when deciding to continue or 
terminate military service and what factors influence their 
decisions? 
 What are the potential implications from adopting a defined 
contribution military retirement system? 
In order to answer the research questions, several pieces of key information 
needed to be collected from the participants. First, a list of factors related to the military 
service profession must be collected. After collection, the authors needed to gain insight 
into the process each service member used or believed they would use to arrive at the stay 
or leave decision. At first glance, this process seems simple and fairly linear in nature, 
however it is actually extremely complex. The complexity lies in the fact that these 
questions, while asked in group setting, apply uniquely to each military member. As such 
every person will consider a combination of different factors and each will weigh them 
differently in arriving at their decision. This provides for an almost unlimited amount of 
combinations and permeations that would be impossible to fully model statistically. Thus, 
the data required to answer the primary research questions is largely qualitative in nature 
and the method chosen to collect the necessary data had to account for the type of data 
sought. 
B. FOCUS GROUP RATIONALE 
Building upon the qualitative nature of the data sought to answer the research 
questions, the authors considered several different data collection methods. These 
methods included surveys, interviews, and focus groups. Each of these methods had its 
strengths and weaknesses, however it was determined that focus groups offered the best 
chance to obtain the necessary data. The focus group method allowed the authors to ask 
open-ended questions that encouraged the participants to reveal not only the factors they 
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considered or would consider, but also insight into the model they used or would use to 
make their decisions.   
Focus groups also cast the authors as moderators in a discussion on military 
retirement policy rather than examiners questioning the value of changing military 
retirement policy. These ideas are reinforced by the research of Professor Jenny Kitzinger, 
who writes in her paper that the focus group dynamic “allows the participants to work 
alongside the researcher.”  Kitzinger goes on to suggest that attitudes are not necessarily 
always captured by responses to direct questioning and a more complete responses to 
questions are one of the many benefits of the focus group approach.107  Since the quality 
of the research is directly related to the quality of the data collected, complete and 
thoughtful responses to the focus group questions were paramount above other factors. In 
addition, since focus groups encourage participants to consider the rationale behind their 
responses, the authors felt they could evoke rational rather than emotional responses from 
the participants. Focus groups ultimately offered the best chance to obtain the type and 
quality of data desired, necessitating its choice as the data collection method. 
C. STUDY DESIGN 
The design of the study was relatively straightforward. The authors sought to 
recruit both enlisted and officer personnel across all services from the Naval Postgraduate 
School (NPS) and the Defense Language Institute (DLI), both located in Monterey, 
California. Each group was targeted for between 6 and12 participants each. The authors 
would moderate the focus groups and record all of the data via voice recorder and 
whiteboard. Since the research required interaction with human subjects, the authors had 
to seek approval from the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at both NPS and DLI before 
conducting any research. After completing the necessary paperwork and training, the 
authors received approval from the IRB at NPS to conduct the focus groups. The IRB at 
DLI declined the authors’ application to conduct research on their students. IRB 
administrators at DLI cited the large workload and relative lack of military experience 
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and knowledge about retirement policy among their students as reasons to deny the 
research request. As a result, almost all of the potential enlisted participants were 
eliminated from the study. Thus, the data obtained for this study was drawn exclusively 
from the Naval Postgraduate School officer population.   
Recruitment of participants from the study was accomplished through two 
primary means. First, a recruitment letter announcement was posted on the student check-
in page on the NPS intranet. All students must logon to the student check-in page daily so 
all students were given the opportunity to participate in the focus groups if they chose to 
do so. Next, an e-mail was sent from the Graduate School of Business and Public Policy 
Program Officer to other curricula program officers to solicit participation from students 
and military faculty. Potential participants were able to sign up for the time slot that best 
accommodated their personal schedules. 
After initial sign up, the focus groups were organized and conducted. Focus 
groups were scheduled to last approximately 50–60 minutes, however the 
author/moderators would not cut off dialogue if the participants wished to continue the 
discussion. The focus groups were held in a classroom on the Naval Postgraduate School 
campus. The primary research questions were written on the whiteboards, and one of the 
authors listed the dominant themes or answers that emerged from the discussion while the 
other author moderated. The questions that were written on the boards were as follows: 
 How would a defined contribution retirement system change the 
decision making process to stay or leave the military? 
 What factors do you consider when deciding to continue or 
terminate your military service? 
 What are the potential implications from adoption of a Defined 
Contribution system? 
 How do you mitigate the potential negative implications identified 
when switching from a defined benefit to a defined contribution 
retirement system? 
 What are the potential implications for the knowledge base if a 
defined contribution system is adopted? 
Each session started with a question about the participant’s familiarity with the 
DBB’s proposal and recommendations. Based on the participants’ responses, the authors 
 34 
would briefly outline the major themes and proposals of the DBB. Other than the initial 
introduction of the DBB proposals and the focus questions contained on the whiteboards, 
the focus groups were free flowing and exploratory. Participants were encouraged to talk 
about any and all of the questions in any order they chose. The authors/moderators were 
involved in the discussion to the extent of keeping the conversation going, but did not 
steer the conversation in any particular direction and did not inject their personal opinions 
or beliefs into the discussion. 
D. LIMITATIONS 
Limitations in research are always present. Limitations are introduced into 
research either by the design of the data collection method, or the participants in the 
research. While the focus group method of obtaining data for the research questions was 
the best approach for this particular problem, it was not without its limitations. The 
authors tried to mitigate the impacts these limitations had on the overall data collection 
process and the potential follow on effects on the results, but it is impossible to eliminate 
every limitation.   
There are some inherent limitations with the focus group method that are present 
in this study. To begin with, the population from which focusgroup participants were 
drawn was comprised of all military officers. As mentioned earlier, permission was not 
given to conduct focus groups with enlisted service members at the Defense Language 
Institute. This limited the research data to what was gathered from military officers at the 
Naval Postgraduate School. Thus, this report cannot directly attribute any of the themes 
or patterns from the focus groups to enlisted service members. Another round of focus 
groups with enlisted members would need to be conducted in order to present a 
comprehensive model representing both enlisted and officer viewpoints. Another 
limitation of the focus group method is the lack of statistical analysis. Focus groups 
research does not involve numerical analysis; rather it provides dominant themes and 
ideas that can be validated by successive focus groups. Iowa State University writes in 
their article “Focus Group Fundamentals” that numerical analysis of focus group data “is 
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not the preferred technique.”108  The limitation manifests itself in that the data cannot be 
represented numerically in traditional tables and graphs or projected from a small sample 
to a larger population with any measure of statistical certainty.   
In addition to the limitations imposed by the method of data collection, human 
subjects themselves inject limitations into research. Bias or a lack of knowledge about the 
subject of the research affects the quality of the data and can subsequently affect the 
results of the research.   In the case of this study, the authors were forced to rely on the 
knowledge and sophistication of the focus group participants as it relates to military 
retirement policy reform. The focus groups were open to all students at NPS without 
qualification. Hence, an assumption was made that military officers who agreed to 
participate were interested in the nature of the research and possessed a level of 
knowledge that allowed them to substantively contribute to the individual focus group 
discussions.   
Furthermore, participants were drawn from all military services across different 
ranks and possessing varying amounts of military service. However, they were asked to 
describe their decision-making process a varying stages of a military career whether they 
had reached those milestones or not. Thus, many of the responses are projections of what 
they might do or think rather than what they actually did or thought. Finally, all of the 
officers participating in the focus groups are subject to the current military retirement 
system. The focus group questions asked them to craft their responses under the 
framework of a defined contribution system they know does not currently apply to them. 
Hence, their responses are essentially projections based on what they perceive to be the 
benefits and limitations of a defined contribution system compared to current policy. This 
limits or potentially biases the data by advancing or confirming both individual and group 
themes that may or may not be actual representations of preference. This premise is 
confirmed by Kitzinger in her writing on focus groups. She reasons that a potential 
negative of focus groups and human subject research is that the group dynamic can often 
silence individual viewpoints and a dominant individual may be successful in passing off 
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an individual theme as a group theme.109  A situation such as the one described here 
potentially biases the data and affects the research, and its effects are compounded by the 
inability to eliminate its effects from the research design.110 
E. CONCLUSION 
This chapter briefly describes the methodology used to capture data for use in 
analyzing and answering the primary research questions. Several data collection methods 
were considered, but ultimately the focus group method offered the best combination of 
providing quality data with the least amount of limitations. The focus groups were 
conducted very simply with a large emphasis on the free-flowing exchange of 
information and ideas among voluntary participants in order to elicit unencumbered 
responses with limited bias. This emphasis on unencumbered responses allows for more 
complete analysis and a smaller chance of tainted data. 
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IV. VOLUNTARY TURNOVER AND THE DECISION TO STAY 
OR QUIT 
A. OVERVIEW 
This chapter provides an introduction to the unfolding model of voluntary 
turnover as developed by Lee and Mitchel,111 later refined by Lee and colleagues, and 
subsequently modified and adapted for military application by Daniel Holt et al. Within 
the chapter is a description of the unfolding model as it applies to military service, an 
application of that model under the current retirement system, and finally an application 
to the military under a proposed defined contribution system. The data used for this 
analysis was gathered during the six focus groups from the questions “How would 
adoption of a defined contribution retirement system change the decision making process 
to stay or leave the military,” and “What factors are considered when deciding to stay or 
quit the military.”  The data was used to discern the applicability and appropriateness of 
the model to military service under the potential new system. 
B. THE UNFOLDING MODEL OF VOLUNTARY TURNOVER 
The unfolding model was developed in an attempt to better explain “how and why 
people leave organizations.”112  Lee and his colleagues both from the original model and 
the 1999 refined model recognized that the decision to leave was more complicated than 
traditional models suggest, and “the ability to predict voluntary turnover remained 
remarkably weak.”113 Traditional models were primarily based on the assumption that 
individuals made decisions in a rational manner in order to maximize utility. The 
unfolding model differs from this concept and recognizes that people do not always act 
rationally with respect to voluntary turnover. In contrast to a purely economic view of 
decision making, the unfolding model incorporates aspects of Image theory, a generic 
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decision making model where individuals screen new information and determine 
compatibility with three job related images: Value, Trajectory, and Strategic images.   
The value image is described as the set of general values, standards, and 
individual principles that defines a person. The trajectory image is defined 
as the set of goals that energizes and directs an individual’s behavior. The 
strategic image is defined as the set of behavioral tactics and strategies that 
an individual believes to be effective in attaining his or her goals.114 
The process yields alternative options to the current situation and these 
alternatives are most often compared to the status quo. The status quo often prevails in 
this comparison and the individual’s current circumstances remain unchanged. In the rare 
event multiple alternatives exist more traditional methods such as cost/benefit 
comparisons are made before a decision is reached. 
Using image theory as the basis for making decisions, the unfolding model 
characterized the decision to leave an organization as a psychological process with a 
“sequence of deliberations”115 whereby some positive or negative shock, or some other 
factor, compels a person to “evaluate against (a) a preexisting plan of action; (b) the 
individual’s values and goals; and (c) job satisfaction and fulfillment (both professional 
and personal).”116 These deliberations lead the individual down one of seven paths to 
leave the organization.117  Figure 1 is a graphic depiction of the unfolding model, and 
Table 1 describes each of the associated decision paths. 
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Source:  Holt et al, "An Application of the Unfolding Model," 39.
2.  This model includes two military unique paths which are not included in the original and extended unfolding 
model.
1.  An asterisk (*) indicates that the route is not classifiable, and that it represents a theory falsification - a way  in 




1 A shock triggers the enactment of a preexisting action plan or script. The person who has 
experienced the shock leaves without considering his or her current attachment to the 
organization and without his or her current attachment to the organization and without 
considering alternatives. Job satisfaction is irrelevant. 
2 A shock prompts the person to reconsider his or her organizational attachment because 
image violations have occurred. After completing these deliberations, the person leaves 
without a search for alternatives. 
3 A shock produces image violations that, in turn, initiate the persons evaluation of both the 
current job and various alternatives; thus in path 3, leaving typically includes search and 
evaluation. 
4a 
Lower levels of job satisfaction become so salient that people leave without considering 
alternatives. 
4b 
Lower levels of job satisfaction lead explicitly to job search and subsequent evaluation of 
alternatives. 
  NOTE:  Lower levels of job satisfaction become the precipitator instead of a shock. 
5a A shock occurs that triggers the enactment of a preexisting script. The member decides to 
execute the script and leave the organization upon end of enlistment or term. 
5b No shock occurs and the members execute the preexisting action plan. The plan in this case 
is the term of service. 
  Military unique paths:  Individuals may choose to leave the service based on an unexplored 
combination of shocks and scripts. That is the end of  a term or enlistment is the shocking 
event that triggers a reevaluation of the relationship the member has with the 





Source:  Holt et al., “An Application of the Unfolding Model,” 38–40. 
Figure 2.  Decision Paths Leading to Voluntary Turnover  
1. Shocks 
Four of the seven paths are triggered by an event that disturbs or upsets an 
individual’s current state of affairs, termed a shock. A shock is not limited to being 
negative. It can be positive or neutral, expected or unexpected, and internal or external. 
For instance, Holt and company identified the end of a term of service could be 
considered a shock. This subsequently triggers deliberations of deciding to stay or quit, or 
enact a preexisting plan of action to voluntarily leave the service. We analyzed our focus 
group data for shocks. Little direct evidence appears in our data regarding shocks, but it 
can be used to infer many potential shocks by analyzing the decision making factors 
found in Appendix E. The decision making factors represent considerations that service 
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members contemplate when thoughts of quitting arise. So it would follow that if one or 
more of these factors are violated, the service member would perceive it as a jarring event 
thereby inducing one of the paths leading to turnover. 
 
Table 1.   Aggregate Decision-making Factors (Outside is lower, should be up) 
Several factors can induce the decision making process to begin. Table 1 contains 
a portion of the aggregated decision making factors that were identified during the focus 
groups. Several potential shocks can be identified when analyzing these factors. Family 
life was identified in five of the focus groups conducted indicating that this is a major 
component of the decision to stay or quit. For instance, any sort of moving or geographic 
instability can be extremely shocking for the service member and the family. Service 
members understand they will have to PCS multiple times in a career; however, they do 
not always occur at opportune times. Consider a service member and spouse who have 
moved into base housing and found several families of similar size and dynamics. They 
families all become close friends, have weekend and holiday barbecues in the court, and 
develop very close friendships to include their children. Friendships and bonds such as 
these are hard to come by in the military given the frequency at which we change jobs. 
Having to leave a scenario such as this and move to a completely unfamiliar area can be 
very jarring to the entire family. While the service members must accept the 
circumstances, the family may not want to and the entire relationship could become very 
Family Life 5
 -Stability of life
 -Not moving so much
 -Spouse career track
 -Geographic Stability
 -Family support during deployment
Civilian Job Market 4
 -outside Employment Offer






unstable. Thus, thoughts of leaving the service enter in order increase the stability of 
family life and attempt to regain the scenario outlined above. 
Another area that stood out in all the focus groups that could potentially yield a 
shock was the civilian job market. There was almost a universal opinion that jobs are 
readily available in the civilian sector, and that officers were employable. Several groups 
specifically mentioned contractors would aggressively recruit standouts in the military for 
their organizations. Job offers from contractors can also act as a shock to initiate the 
turnover process, especially for those with a large knowledge base, or with particular 
business skills such as those in the procurement area. 
While most of the decision paths begin with a shock, three of the seven do not. 
However, decreased job satisfaction and reassessment of commitment to the organization 
over time serve to initiate the process. Military life is hard and very taxing at times which 
can cause members to simply get burned out and reassess their values and priorities. 
Frequent deployments, field training exercises, and time at sea can take a toll on members 
especially when that time takes away from family. The severity of the dissatisfaction 
leads the employee to either quit without exploring alternatives or begin the search for 
new employment and compare offers to the current situation.  
2. Script 
The next phase of the model involves the script. A script is a pre-existing plan of 
action that individual service members may or may not have. The focus groups identified 
that individuals have vastly differing reasons for joining the service, and many never 
intend on fulfilling a career. The plan is therefore to join the military and complete one or 
two terms of service. In other words, a pre-existing plan to leave already exists. This plan 
might be activated on a pre-existing timeline, or it could be activated by the experience of 
a shock. Reasons for this could be to acquire certain skills that can later be applied in the 
civilian world, or to acquire money for college expenses in the form of the GI Bill. Others 
join to fulfill a career, and some decide to make it a career after their initial term or 
enlistment. Still others might be forced into service in order to satisfy the will of a family 
member who served in past years. Such a decision might cause the individual to serve a 
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term and then leave the service for their own interests regardless of whether a shock was 
experienced. 
3. Image Violation 
The third phase in the process is to determine whether an image violation has 
occurred.  “An image violation occurs when an individual’s values, goals, and strategies 
for goal attainment don’t fit with those of the employing organization or those implied by 
the shock.”118  For instance, the current pension which is received immediately after 20 
YOS is largely regarded as a sacred entitlement that is off the table for cutting. Similarly 
the services have an implicit contract problem where separation of personnel prior to 20 
YOS is “viewed as unfairly breaking an implicit-contract.”119   Because no benefits 
accrue prior to 20 YOS, they are unwilling to separate individuals with 15+ YOS despite 
whatever force management issues are prevailing at that given time. Such an act would 
be viewed as breaking the implicit contract and is ingrained into the culture of the 
military. 
4. Search/evaluation of alternatives and job offers 
The final phase of the process is a search and evaluation of alternatives and 
potential job offers. Ample evidence is provided from the collected data that 
search/evaluation of alternatives is factored into decision making process. Table 2 and 3 
contain the statements and points emphasized during the focus groups. Given the amount 
of time spent on this particular subject during the focus groups, it is highly likely that 
service members will not leave the service without job offers or a high probability of 
obtaining civilian employment. This speaks directly to the idea of employability the 
“capacity to control one’s employment options through the creation, identification, and 
realization of career opportunities.”120  The fact that this subject was discussed in all the 
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focus groups leads us to believe that service members, especially the midcareer personnel 
who participated in the focus groups, believe they are highly employable and capable of 
moving into another field, or will seek to become highly employable if one of the 
decision paths is initiated. 
 
Table 2.   Search for Alternatives and Job Offers 
Table 2 contains statements and ideas from the focus groups regarding search and 
evaluation of job alternatives after the initial term of service. The statements and ideas 
generated seemed to be very financially oriented. For instance, bullet 4 directly states that 
first term personnel will likely go where the money is.   A likely explanation for this is 
first term personnel are still very junior even after four or five years, and many don’t take 
into account all aspects of their compensation. Often base pay is the only factor looked at 
by service members. Consequently, when evaluating employment opportunities only 
regular or base pay is considered, which might be much lower than potential civilian jobs 
offer. So potentially the junior personnel view employability in terms of the ability to 
find a job in which the immediate income is greater than the current income. The long 
term career prospects and other benefits are less of a factor at this stage.  
In contrast, the data on midcareer personnel were heavily focused on the level of 
skills, leadership, and knowledge acquired after 8–10 YOS. In other words, they become 
more focused on their level of employability in terms of furthering their long term 
careers. Table 3 contains several ideas for search and evaluation of job alternatives for 
the midcareer personnel that focus on this aspect of employability. A key factor here is 
that midcareer personnel are mainly in the E-6/O-3 pay grades, the middle managers 
directly involved with day-to-day operations of the military. These folks have developed 
4.  Will go where the money is.
5.  Will entertain the civilian world more frequently.
Search/Evaluation of Alternatives and Job Offers (After Initial Term of Service)
1.  Would always be comparing military life to civilian opportunities
2.  At any point it is easier to make the decision to stay or get out.  But there still needs to be 
a job available.
3.  Always looking for something better.
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multiple skills, both technical and leadership. The experience gained would be very 
useful in the civilian world. In particular, contracting officers have very business oriented 
skill sets and knowledge of the procurement process for DoD. This knowledge could be 
extremely useful for a defense contractor, or some other company wanting to gain 
business from government spending. These skills could be used over multiple firms and 
multiple career fields. Another specialty within DoD which contains very employable 
personnel are the information technology fields. These areas of DoD have very sought 
after skill sets, and a vast amount of education is put into this area. It is also a growing 
sector of the economy which will make individuals with technical knowledge to be even 
more employable in the future. 
 
Table 3.   Search for Alternatives and Job Offers at Midcareer 
C. TURNOVER AND DECISION MAKING UNDER CURRENT 
RETIREMENT SYSTEM 
The data collected for the decision-making process supports the unfolding model 
and provides evidence for the decision making process for military members. However, 
there are some unique characteristics for service personnel that differ from civilian 
employment. For enlisted personnel, their service is broken up into terms of 4–6 years, 
where each term must be fulfilled before the individual can leave the service. This aspect 
implies that natural shocks will occur periodically in intervals of 4–6 years. After each 
term the member must decide whether to reenlist for another term or leave the service. 
The term of service is essentially a script, a preexisting plan committing the service 
member to remain on duty for the specified period of time.   During that time period other 
6.  Hard to change careers as you get older…you are that much further behind in the civilian 
workforce.
5.  More senior guys getting out.
4.  Contractors can make more in civlian world.  Their skills transfer.
3.  Hemmorage E-6/O-3's.  Middle management.
2.  Encourages members to leave at the mid-career point - economy dependent.
1.  Must consider that while you might have an engineer degree, you haven't used it while in 
the military.  Skills erode.
Search/Evaluation of Alternatives and Job Offers (Midcareer)
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shocks may occur aside from those naturally occurring one, or general decreases in 
commitment to the organization could initiate a reevaluation their service. Since the 
member must complete the contract, the ability to act is limited, which might also 
increase the desirability of leaving the organization. For officers the initial term mirrors 
that of enlisted personnel. However, some branches, such as the Marine Corps, require 
the officers to be augmented or selected to continue service. If selected to continue, there 
are no longer terms of service and the officer can stay or quit at any time. This is 
equivalent to many civilian jobs where the decision to stay can be made at any time. Of 
course there are always special situations where benefits are given to the individual in 
exchange for commitment to service time. One such situation is selection for Naval 
Postgraduate School (NPS). NPS is a graduate level school that provides an opportunity 
for selected members to receive a Master’s degree. Upon completion the officer must pay 
back the service for the opportunity by committing to a specified number of years of 
service. This might constitute a new plan for the individual to complete the degree and 
the associated term of service, or might be part of an existing plan already in place. The 
end of the payback time could also serve as a shock to initiate one of the decision paths, 
although there is no forcing mechanisms making the member leave the service as there is 
with the end of a contract for the enlisted personnel. So nothing inherent in the payback 
period ending prompts the officer to make a stay/leave decision. 
Holt and his colleagues were able to classify 83% of the participants into one of 
the decision paths outlined by their modified model. Tables 6 and 7 provide a summary 
of the results gathered from Holt’s application of the unfolding model. 
 
















Table 5.   Percentage of Participants That Fell into One of the Decision Paths 
While the data collected during the focus groups is not sufficient to verify the numbers 
generated by the Holt study, they can be used to identify what potential shocks can be 
identified, or what image violations may occur during the decision making process. All 
the groups provided decision making factors which can be classified into one of the three 
images outlined by image theory. The data gathered on the decision making process also 
identify that individuals join the services for various reasons such as for educational 
benefits or to gain experience in a profession. Support for the model is also found in the 
search and evaluation criteria. All the focus groups identified searching for alternative 
employment as part of the decision making process to stay or leave, and they identified 
this both after initial enlistment and during the midcareer stage. 
1. Decision making after the Initial Term of Service 
Each member serves an initial term of service for 4–6 years and each member has 
some sort of script to follow, although this preexisting plan might be as simple as 
completing the term and leaving the service. The end of the term serves as a natural 
shock beginning the psychological process of deciding to stay or leave, comparing their 
value, trajectory, and strategic images with alternatives, search and evaluation of job 
alternatives, and finally a decision to stay or quit.   
  










Script Data (After initial Term) 
1. Some come in with a plan. 
2. Initial joins are for various reasons. 
3. Career dependent - Acquisition corp, some have plan (Education / Experience), some join 
just for retirement. 
4. Different motivations for joining. 
Table 6.   Script Data after Initial Term of Service 
Holt identified that 38% of the personnel who left had some sort of plan in place. 
Table 6 contains some of the statements that support this notion. For instance, many 
service members join for various reasons to include acquiring education and experience. 
The plan here is to complete the initial term and reevaluate. If the level of education and 
experience is sufficient, the member can simply complete the contract and follow 
decision path 5b. If the member engages in some sort of job search and evaluation then 
path 5a is followed. We are unable to discern whether or not a shock occurred other than 
the end of term and the data obtained do not identify particular shocks. While 38% of 
individuals did have a preexisting plan to follow, 62% did not have a plan so turnover 
must have occurred via another path. 
Holt’s data identified image violations occurring in 84% of the turnover decisions 
and job search and evaluation in 94% of the cases suggesting a large amount of turnover 
for military members occurs via paths 3 and 4. While the decision making factors 
gathered can be used to speculate on what image violations might occur, it was clear 
during the focus groups that retirement is likely not something that causes them at this 
point. Several groups stated that retirement isn’t a decisive consideration at this point in a 
career. Twenty YOS is a very long ways off, and much of the thinking for younger 
personnel is short term in nature. The DBB research also cited that retirement doesn’t 
become a factor until at least the 8–10 YOS point. 
2. Decision Making at the Midcareer Point 
The midcareer point is considered the period of service in the 8–12 YOS range, 
and is the critical period of the decision making process for military members. At this 
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point in the career the decision to stay realistically commits the member to 20 YOS. The 
retirement system is directly attributable to the decision making process at this point. At 
this juncture if the member commits to staying, the thought process is “If I stay another 
10 years I’ll receive lifetime annuity of 50% of base pay with cost of living increases 
yearly.”  The majority of members who remain after 8–10 YOS will stay until the 20 
YOS point and then leave with full benefits. In essence, the member forms a new plan to 
remain in the service until that 20-year point. The power of the 20-year vesting rule and 
the value of the pension are so great that rarely will any shock, or image violations, or 
negative job satisfaction be able to force the individual to quit. Decision path 5a or 5b 
hold here in this instance. The shock experienced could be the end of a 20-year career 
and the preexisting plan is retirement. Image violations and job satisfaction become 
irrelevant at this stage. 
The basic implication here is that 20-year vesting insulates the individual from 
paths 3, and 4. The opportunities to make a stay/leave decision are limited between the 
initial term of service and the midcareer point, and the cliff vesting serves to lock the 
individual into a 20 year plan during the midcareer years. The benefits that must be given 
up are too large to give up.   
Figure 3 depicts the unfolding model as it applies to a military career from the 
midcareer to 20 YOS. Decision paths 1 and 5a are essentially the same. In path 1 the end 
of the final term serves as the shock which initiates the decision making-process. Since it 
is the final term of service and the member is eligible for the pension, he/she simply 
retires from active duty with no job search or employment offers. This can be viewed as a 
typical retirement scenario where the individual retires from the work force and pursues 
other goals. While this is possible, it is unlikely as most members retiring at 20 YOS are 
still fairly young, and living off of the pension alone can be challenging especially if the 
member has children who are close to college age. Under decision path 5a the member 
plan was to finish out a 20 year career and then transition into a second career stage. 
Given that the member intends to begin a second career upon leaving the service, they 
engage in search and evaluation of alternatives and leave with expectations of a job offer 
in hand of to obtain one soon after leaving the service. Decision path 2 is also not very 
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likely as it depicts a service member leaving in an irrational manner with no plan, and no 
search and/or evaluation of alternatives and no likely offers. Since the data collected 
focused quite a bit on employability and job availability, it is unlikely many service 
members would leave via this path. Finally, path 5b is most likely associated with the 
officer corps vice the enlisted side. Under path 5b, a general decrease in the level of 
commitment to military service occurs. This decrease in satisfaction and commitment 
isn’t great enough to give up the lifetime annuity, so the plan to retire is enacted and the 
search/evaluation criteria become irrelevant. It is very possible under this scenario that 
while no job search is conducted, the plan might be to retire and spend time with family, 
or simply relax for a while after 20 years of deployment, frequent PCS moves, and 
multiple field exercises.   
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3. Decision Making past 20 YOS 
Little data was collected regarding decision making after the 20 YOS point as 
most of the volunteers were in their midcareer and had difficulty visualizing what they 
would be thinking at that stage in a career. However, our belief is that the unfolding 
model still holds after the 20 YOS point. It is likely that retirement as a factor in the 
decision making process becomes less important. Each individual knows they can retire 
with at least 50% of their base pay and the incentive to leave is very high as the intent of 
the system is to incentivize people to leave after 20 to promote youth and vigor within the 
ranks.  
Given that the system as it stands is structured to incentivize people to leave, 
perhaps it is more appropriate to focus on why individuals decide to stay past 20 YOS. 
One of the measures of the retirement system is selective retention, the idea that the 
services want to retain certain individuals past the 20 YOS point. The individuals targeted 
are highly skilled, with vast experience that can only be attained over a lengthy career. 
Perhaps the reason these people stay have to deal with career orientation, or goals for 
attaining certain rank. Or maybe individuals decide to stay because of a lack of 
employability.   There are many jobs within the services such as combat arms which 
generate a great deal of firm specific knowledge for the individual making them highly 
skilled in the within their organization. However, firm specific skills do not readily 
transfer into the civilian job market, thus personnel in the combat arms specialties might 
feel they lack sufficient employability and decide to stay in the service. 
4. Decision Making for Existing Personnel upon Modification of the 
Current Retirement System 
Since the DBB proposal is such a radical shift in concept for a retirement system, 
it is fitting to discuss what the decision making process might look like for existing 
service members who experience a change in the system during some portion of a career. 
The DBB proposed to two alternatives for transition to a revised system: a high and low 
cost alternative. The high-cost alternative grandfathered existing service members into 
the current system. The low-cost alternative would force service members to transition to 
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the new system immediately, with proportional accrued from the old plan. So a member 
at 10 YOS would receive 25% of base pay upon retiring after 20 YOS, and begin 
accruing the DC benefit from 10 YOS until retirement. The effects on decision making 
would likely be very different under these two alternatives. 
Under the low-cost (to government) alternative, modification and forced transition 
would be the shock triggering one of the decision paths (1, 2, or 3). A shock such as this 
would be viewed by service members as breaking the psychological contract mentioned 
earlier, especially for those that have passed the midcareer point. These service members 
essentially accept an unwritten contract to serve at least 20 YOS and expect the full 
pension to be paid upon retiring from the service. Taking that away would certainly 
create multiple image violations, thoughts of quitting, and ultimately, turnover. The 
magnitude of the turnover is not a focus of this paper, but we infer it would be significant 
given the image violations from breaking the implicit contract between the military and 
its service members. These assumption lead us favor decision path 2 and 3. However, 
decision path 1 is still an alternative. The results of the DBB proposal have been known 
for several years giving members time to develop scripts in case modification of the 
system didn’t include grandfathering; but, the Secretary of Defense has said multiple 
times that existing service members would be grandfathered so we view this as the most 
likely case upon implementation of any changes. 
The high cost alternative would include grandfathering of current members, and 
affect only the incoming service members. While we believe that this would mitigate the 
enormous shock and subsequent image violations felt without grandfathering current 
members, there is a possibility of increasing turnover initially in the newer service 
members. One of the focus groups mentioned the psychological impacts of members with 
differing retirement plans, especially for the junior personnel with clearly less benefits. 
The perception of inequality could increase image violations for these personnel initially, 
and therefore turnover might increase in the lower ranks until a steady state of the new 
DC system is attained. This leads us to lean towards turnover occurring via paths 4 or 5. 
The perception of inequality leads to general dissatisfaction and decreased commitment 
to the force.   
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Regardless of an increase in turnover in the junior personnel under this scenario, it 
is our view that the impacts to the force will be much greater under a scenario without 
grandfathering. The breaking of the psychological contract cannot be overstated. It has 
been engrained into the culture of the services since codification of the retirement system 
in 1949. To not honor this contract could potentially cause ripples within the force, that 
would be incredibly difficult to repair. 
D. TURNOVER AND DECISION MAKING UNDER A DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION SYSTEM 
The decision making process to stay or leave changes dramatically under a 
defined contribution system. Under a DC plan the hook of the immediate pension and 
cliff vesting ceases to exist as a factor pulling members to 20 YOS. The personnel 
making stay/leave decisions no longer have to focus on “vertical career advancement 
within a single employment setting.” 121   Instead they gain the ability to pursue a 
boundary-less career, one characterized by “independence from, rather than dependence 
on, traditional organizational career arrangements.”122   These same phenomena have 
been ongoing in the civilian sector where “job tenure and job stability”123 have been 
decreasing for the past few decades. Consequently, the focus of employees has shifted 
from the “organization toward personal career development.”124  Since the pension will 
cease to play such a major factor in deciding to stay or leave the military, it forces 
individual members to focus on career development and employability in order to remain 
competitive. This is not to say that members will lose the commitment to service that 
many feel and pursue civilian careers; but it does mean that they have that option since 
the notion of a 20-year career is gone. In this case all the decision-making factors 
identified will be used to screen incoming information in deciding to stay or quit. 
Essentially, the decision to stay/leave can be made more frequently and on a continuous 
                                                 
121 Direnzo and Greenhaus, “Job Search,” 570.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               
122 Ibid. 
123 Ibid., 569. 
124 Ibid., 570. 
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basis. While members will still have to complete their terms of service, they won’t be 
influenced or have to worry about giving up a lifetime annuity. In other words the whole 
decision tree outlined in the unfolding model becomes extremely relevant with no 
insulation from the decision paths post midcareer. 
1. Decision Making after the Initial Term of Service 
The decision-making process during the initial term of service should essentially 
follow the same paths as the current system. Many will choose to execute their script at 
the end of initial term (path 5a or 5b), and others will realize that military life and culture 
aren’t a great fit for their particular images and decide to leave (paths 4a and 4b). For 
many individuals retirement still isn’t a major component of the decision making process. 
A 20- or 30-year career seems like an eternity for younger personnel, and benefits 
accrued under a DC plan are relatively miniscule after only a few years. The benefits also 
can’t be drawn until much later in life. Table 7 provides all the ideas generated by the 
focus groups that are pertinent to the decision-making process after the initial term.   
 
Table 7.   Ideas Generated on Adopting Defined Contribution after Initial Term 
While the decision-making process is relatively similar at this point, there is 
evidence that the defined contribution system might help increase retention after the 
Ideas generated on adopting defined contribution system
7.  Might encourage folks to stay longer - dependent on why the member joined in the first 
place.
11.  Both easier to make the decision to stay in or get out.
10.  Start questioning do I want to stay / do I like the service?
9.  Not that much has been sacraficed at this point / not as much time invested so can stay a 
little longer and not be hurt.
8.  DC not so much of a factor at this point.  Retirement in general not all that important here.
1.  Not thinking about retirement
2.  Doesn't matter…they're not thinking about retirement anyway.
3.  Process to make the decision doesn't actually change at this step (Can either execute plan 
or not).
6.  Dependent on term length (4, 5, 6, 8 year terms)
5.  Might decide to stay longer…1 more deployment
4.  Probably no impact here
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initial term. Table 8 breaks the data down into two major themes that were observed for 
decision making after the initial term of service. 
 
Table 8.   Major Themes and Associated Comments for after the Initial Term of Service 
What changes under the DC plan is the ability of the members to accrue benefits, 
which they couldn’t do under the pension system. Accrual of benefits allows the member 
to remain in the service for longer without having to sacrifice much. For instance, if an 
individual has been with a unit for several years and deployed several times with them 
there is a sense of loyalty and camaraderie that is established. The individual might have 
a preexisting plan to finish out the current contract reevaluate the alternatives. Now the 
unit is set to deploy close to the individuals end of service date, but the end of contract 
forces the individual begin the decision making process to stay or quit.   Under the old 
system, if a member stayed in the service they accrued no benefits, but would have to 
commit to 4 more year of service. Under a DC system, the decision to stay and deploy 
with the unit is easier since the member would continue to accrue benefits. Even though 
retirement is not a key factor in the decision making process at this time, the idea that 
committing to more service with no added accrual in benefits no longer exists. Further, if 
the member decides to leave after the second term the accrued benefits would follow him, 
and could continue to grow under a new employer. 
1.  Might decide to stay longer…1 more deployment
3.  Doesn't matter…they're not thinking about retirement anyway.
4.  DC not so much of a factor at this point.  Retirement in general not all 
that important here.
No Change / Not a 
factor
1.  Process to make the decision doesn't actually change at this step 
(Can either execute plan or not).
2.  Probably no impact here
Direct Comments from Focus Groups
2.  Might encourage folks to stay longer - dependent on why the 
member joined in the first place.
3.  Not that much has been sacraficed at this point / not as much time 




Another potential reason why individuals might choose to stay another term is to 
increase their employability. First term service members will have gained much 
education during their initial term, but not a great deal of experience. It is experience 
coupled with education which produces tacit knowledge and the skills necessary for 
career progression and increased employability. During the initial term there isn’t very 
much time for more than one tour, but another term will allow the individual to have one 
or two more tours of duty thereby increasing the experience and skill level. This might 
also help the individual increase the level of social capital (who you know), which could 
be of great assistance in transitioning from the military into a civilian career. 
2. Decision Making at the Midcareer Point 
The midcareer point is where the most significant difference occurs in regards to 
the decision-making process. All of the focus groups identified the 8–10 year point as 
being the critical time in deciding to stay or leave. Table 9 is an aggregated table of the 
comments and ideas regarding the midcareer. Much of the discussion during the focus 
groups revolved around this idea, as well as many of the directed points stated that idea 
outright. Where the pension system would mitigate some of the image violations and job 
satisfaction issues, a DC system doesn’t mitigate any of them. For this reason any shocks 
that trigger thoughts of leaving, or general loss of commitment to the military will have 
no offset. The services become wide open to image violations and members don’t need to 
commit basically a 10-year script and retire at 20 YOS.   
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Table 9.   Decision-making Data for the Midcareer stage 
Several factors are at play at the midcareer point that make this time period so 
critical in the decision making process. The first factor is that the 20 year pension that 
was so instrumental in locking in members to stay for at least 20 years is no longer a 
factor. The decision process becomes much more difficult and a DC plan and all the 
decision making factors (Appendix E) will come be used when deciding to stay or quit. 
Instead of committing to a 10 year plan of action and making a simple financial decision 
(lifetime annuity after 20 YOS), the member must now go through deliberation process as 
outlined in the unfolding model. The bottom line from all the collected data is a DC plan 
provides no incentive to stay for a 20 year career. 
There are also many other criteria that factor into the equation during this time 
frame. During this time frame service members are in their late twenties, are potentially 
married, have several years of experience, and good skill sets. Table 10 Table 10? is a 
modification of Table 3 and displays the potential image violations that were discussed in 
17.  Hard to change careers as you get older…you are that much further behind in the civilian 
workforce.
16.  After 10 years it would be easy to leaver with benefits.
15.  This is the critical decision making time.
14.  Educated middle management - critical decision making point for them.
13.  Hemmorage E-6/O-3's.  Middle management.
12.  More people getting out.
11.  11 year mark
10.  Retirement  at the forefront of your mind here.
9.  Easier to leave here with a lump sum of money.
8.  This would remain the decision point to stay/leave.
7.  Encourages members to leave at the mid-career point - economy dependent.
5.  Easier to leave
4.  No incentive to stay
3.  Decision to stay/leave might need to be made at the 6-7 year point.
6.  This will become the defining decision time period on whether to stay or leave.  (Implies 
that after this period people are members would be more likely to stay in for longer time 
period)
Midcareer (8-12 YOS): Critical Decision Making Point
2.  Incentives would need to be placed here for retention
1.  Process changes for the mid career field.
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at least three of the focus groups and adds comments from the decision making process 
questions that correspond to those images. The most frequent image violation was family 
life, according to the decision-making factors. This image violation makes complete 
sense because at the midcareer point many service members have deployed multiple 
times, families suffer while their spouses and parents are gone, and multiple permanent 
change of station moves have probably occurred. Each of these can be considered a shock 
which initiates one of the decision paths. Since family life plays such a heavy role in the 
value image, we can discern that image violations will occur and without the benefit of 




Table 10.   Potential Image Violations with Supporting Comments from Focus Groups 
 
2.  Know what system you 
joined and how it works
4.  Would always be 
comparing military life to 
civilian opportunities
 2.  Family becomes important 
decsion criteria.




and strategies that 
the person believes 












1.  Career Progression
 -Real Military Compensation (RMC)
 -Tax Benefits
 -Non-Cash Benefits
2.  Encourages members to 
leave at the mid-career point - 
economy dependent.
3.  Hard to change careers as 
you get older…you are that 
much further behind in the 
civilian workforce.
1.  Easier to leave here with a 
lump sum of money.
2.  Contractors can make more 
in civlian world.  Their skills 
transfer.
1.  Dependent on how career 
is going.
2.  Current compensation
 -Comparable Civilian Salary
 -outside Employment
1.  Civilian Job Market 1.  Must consider that while 
you might have an engineer 
degree, you haven't used it 
while in the military.  Skills 
erode.
(Set of important 
values regarding 
his/her job)
 -Family support during deployment
 -Geographic Stability
 -Wife career track
 -Not moving so much
 -Stability of life
1.  reasons for staying change 
at this 
point…marriage/children.
Value Image 3.  Family Life
1.  Medical Benefits / Healthcare
1.  Always be looking at 
QOL/Job Opportunities.
2.  Qualtiy of life
Comments from FG
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Current compensation is another factor that was discussed in at least three of the 
groups. The adoption of a DC plan is a clear reduction in military compensation, with the 
risk of retirement security shifted to the individual. The much-needed security for 
retirement becomes another factor to consider. If the individual can increase take home 
pay in the civilian job market, it would allow the individual to increase retirement savings 
and in turn retirement security. The major point here is that the military retirement system 
becomes comparable to most civilian programs so the military loses its status as being a 
differentiator. It is ironic that one of the measures of the retirement system is civilian 
comparability and the pension system has been criticized for not being comparable. 
Adopting a DC system fixes that metric, but leaves the services wide open competition 
with the civilian job market. The military will always be disadvantaged in this area 
because it is an internal labor market which must promote from within in order to achieve 
the necessary force structure. The civilian sector in contrast doesn’t have this constraint 
and can choose to utilize military members to fill important positions. Indeed much of the 
data suggested that military members believed they were highly employable and that jobs 
would be available for military service members with experience and a broad base of 
human capital (HC). Certain specialties such as pilots, information technology (IT) 
personnel, and contractors have specific transferrable skills that are in high demand in the 
civilian world. 
Job search and evaluation was mentioned consistently in all of the focus groups, 
and Holt observed that 94% of the turnover decisions had job search associated. It is 
likely that since alternative employment seems so important to the military community, 
that some specialty’s will be able to turnover easier than others. One area that hasn’t been 
mentioned is the information technology field. This is becoming an important sector 
within DoD and personnel in associated fields receive highly technical training making 
them very marketable. Because of these decision paths 3 and 4b might increase 
significantly under a DC system. The more technically oriented specialties will have an 
easier time finding employment than say combat arms personnel. Combat arms skills 
don’t necessarily transfer as easily into the civilian sector which would likely help retain 
some of those personnel. 
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Finally, another key factor in the decision-making process is the idea of 
psychological mobility. Psychological mobility “is the subjective appraisal of ones 
capacity to make career transitions.”125  This issue wasn’t discussed in any of the focus 
groups, but given the near universal opinion that 8–10 YOS would be the critical decision 
making point it is likely that service members believe that there ability to transition into a 
new career (or the civilian workforce) is highest at this particular time period. At this 
stage in a career it is likely that individuals haven’t completely embedded themselves in 
the routines and culture of their respective service, thus it is easier to make the transition 
into the civilian workforce. They also likely realize that the longer they stay in the 
military, the potential to transition into the civilian job market diminishes as the added 
skills and experience that are acquired become more firm specific. Firm specific skills are 
the skills and knowledge acquired that relate specifically to an individual or 
organizational context. Contrast that with general human capital that is “non-firm specific 
skills that are acquired through via education and on-the-job general training.” In effect 
the longer the individual remains in the military the more his skills become viable for 
military career progression, but not necessarily for use in the civilian job market. 
3. Decision making past 20 YOS 
There was very little data collected for the decision making process in the later 
stages of a military career. However, it was mentioned that members who remained in the 
service until the later career stages would likely remain until forced out. The reason is 
that there is no incentive to get out and retire. One of the main goals of the current system 
is to encourage people to turnover at the 20 year point or shortly thereafter. DC plans 
don’t force that issue.   
Psychological mobility and the idea of job embeddedness also can play a role in 
decision making in the later stages of a military career. It has already been mentioned that 
psychological mobility will tend to decrease the longer the service member remains on 
active duty unless their skills are directly transferrable to the civilian sector. Job 
                                                 
125 Direnzo and Greenhaus, “Job Search,” 576. 
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embeddedness can also play a role in the decision to stay or leave. Job embeddedness “is 
composed of (1) the fit between a person’s job and other important facets of life, (2) the 
links or ties an individual has with coworkers and work activities, and (3) the personal 
sacrifices that would need to be made if an individual were to leave his or her 
position.”126  As military personnel remain in the service for longer time periods the level 
of embeddedness increases, and it remains harder and harder to leave the organization. 
For instance, we believe the members who are likely to stay for at least 20 years are those 
that highly embody the military lifestyle and culture, or those that feel a lack of 
employability (thus value job security) or don’t feel they have the capacity to move into a 
new position or begin a new career. Over a 20 year career service members develop deep 
ties to fellow brothers in arms, and a high sense of camaraderie that is difficult to let go. 
They have also become familiar with a certain lifestyle characterized by a rigid hierarchy 
of command and control. This lifestyle is very appealing to many, especially the ones 
who choose to remain in the services that long under a defined contribution system. 
These members would be staying because they want, not necessarily because they are 
being pulled by a large financial incentive. Also, the longer the member remains in the 
service past 20 years the harder it is to leave and start a second career. 
Another factor might be the realization that the ability to earn the comparable 
benefits in the civilian sector is diminished. This fact has been observed over the years as 
most military retirees earn less than the wages prior to retirement. The annuity under the 
old system helped offset this earnings loss, so a decrease in pay wasn’t realized. In many 
situations the member could actually see an increase in pay when the annuity is added in. 
Under a DC system, this advantage no longer exists, which makes remaining in the 
service a more attractive option. 
Since the DC system doesn’t incentivize individuals to leave the service, it is 
likely that this would cause and aging of the force structure, particularly at the upper end 
of the rank structure. An older force structure would have a positive impact on the level 
of human capital as the firm specific skills and tacit knowledge acquired remain in the 
                                                 
126 Ibid. 
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services. Since the level of HC increases at the top, it would allow for it to filter down 
into the rest of the force potentially increasing the level of HC for the entire force. 
However, the areas of the force with highly transferrable skills may not experience these 
phenomena as those individuals are the ones most likely to leave in the midcareer range; 
so highly qualified and skilled individuals will be lacking in the upper ranks of the force. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The unfolding model is a vast improvement over previous turnover models, and 
has been much more successful in identifying why people leave organizations. It also 
proved successful in explaining military turnover and even better when the two military 
specific paths are added to account for the terms of service associated with military life. 
The following are several key takeaways from our analysis of the decision making 
process. 
1. Terms of Service Produce Naturally Occurring Shocks That Initiate 
the Decision-making Process at Predictable Time Intervals 
The terms of service create natural shocks periodically which could trigger 
turnover via one of the decision paths under either system. While they limit the number 
of times a member must make a stay/leave decision, they also serve as a trigger initiating 
the process. The terms provide a sense of stability and job security for members, and can 
be viewed as a preexisting plan of action that can be enacted at the end of the term, or by 
some other shock.  
2. The Midcareer Point Is the Key Decision-making Time Frame under 
both Retirement Systems 
It was clear throughout all of the focus groups that the midcareer is the key 
decision making point. Under the current system, this time period is when the hook of 20 
year vesting grabs members and allows them to create a long term plan to serve 20 years. 
The power of this hook is so great that job dissatisfaction and image violations become 
essentially irrelevant as a script is developed for members to complete 20 YOS before 
reevaluating. Therefore, turnover is drastically reduced under this system. The service 
members and military departments are insulated from decision paths 3 and 4. 
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Under a DC system the midcareer becomes the point at which employability in 
the civilian sector is highest, especially for those specialties and skill sets that transfer 
easily into the civilian sector. There is also a high degree of psychological mobility for 
members in this time period. Contracting officers, pilots, and information technology 
personnel are examples of specialties which provide transferrable skills and knowledge to 
enhance career progression in a civilian setting. For these reasons we believe turnover 
will likely increase and retention of the E-6/O-3 cohort could become quite difficult. The 
DBB mentions that a DC system would add flexibility to force management; however, it 
negates to mention that while the services will have flexibility the individual members 
who make up the force also gain more flexibility. 
3. The Effects of Modifying the Current System Without 
Grandfathering Are Dangerous 
Modification of the system is likely to produce increased turnover; however, 
grandfathering serves to mitigate some of that risk. Eliminating the pension for current 
service member’s breaks the psychological contract that is implicit under the current 
system, and multiple image violations would occur without grandfathering forcing 
members to leave the service in a dysfunctional manner. The magnitude of this type of 
turnover could be potentially devastating. 
4. Human Capital Under a DC   
The DC system allows the midcareer personnel the ability to pursue alternative 
career paths, and thus increases in turnover will appear in the E-6/O-3 personnel. This 
would leave the most dedicated and military oriented individuals to remain in the service, 
with no incentive to leave as employability and psychological mobility decrease the 
longer the individuals remain in the service. Since there is no incentive to leave the age of 
the workforce would increase and thus produce an increase in HC at the upper echelon of 
personnel. However, the loss of many midcareer personnel especially, those with high 
demand skills and knowledge, would leave a void in the services in these areas. Thus, a 
decrease in HC would be experienced in these areas which are most likely critical for our 
future success as a military organization. 
 65 
V. IMPLICATIONS TO THE FORCE FROM SWITCHING FROM 
DEFINED BENEFIT TO DEFINED CONTRIBUTION RETIRMENT 
SYSTEMS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The previous chapter dealt with the decision-making process military officers use 
when deciding to stay or leave military service and compared the focus group data to an 
established model. Building upon that data analysis, this chapter analyzes the focus group 
data and presents implications to the force resulting from potential changes to DoD 
military retirement policy. It is necessary to first understand the decision-making process 
military members use because force implications develop as a reaction to or as a result of 
a perceived change in the value of military retirement benefits by the service-member. 
This triggers the decision-making process discussed in the previous chapter and the 
outcomes of that process aggregated force-wide constitute implications to the force. 
B. BACKGROUND & FRAMING 
Since the basis of this report revolves around the potential adoption of a defined 
contribution plan similar to the one proposed by the DBB, its findings and arguments are 
particularly relevant to our data analysis. Chief among the DBB findings are the 
arguments that the current military retirement system “is more generous and more 
expensive compared to the private sector” and that it is unaffordable.127  The DBB goes 
on to outline, in appendices E and F of their report, the cost savings to DoD from 
switching to a defined contribution plan under an immediate or phased transition from the 
current system.128  The most significant aspect of the DBB argument is that the cost 
savings are entirely the result of reduced contributions to the military trust fund resulting 
from the recommended policy change. Thus, while the DBB never explicitly states that 
the goal or objective of its proposal is the reduction of military retirement benefits, an 
analysis of its argument and its supporting documentation strongly suggests benefit 
                                                 
127 Defense Business Board, 24. 
128 Ibid., 39-40. 
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reduction is possible if not likely. It is certainly reasonable to assert based on the report 
that a change of this type introduces variability and risk to benefits that do not currently 
exist in the system as constituted. This perception of a reduced retirement benefit as a 
result of the implementation of the DBB’s proposal or something similar was prevalent 
throughout the focus groups. This drove the participants to consider the impacts both 
individually and organizationally. 
C. METHODOLOGY AND ORGANIZATION 
As discussed in Chapter 3 of this report, the focus group approach of data 
collection does not lend itself to numerical analysis. Thus, numerical analysis is not used 
here. Instead, dominant themes from each focus group and decision factors used to arrive 
at a stay or leave decision are used in the analysis. The frequency with which these 
themes and decision factors were mentioned among all six focus groups indicates their 
relative strength or weakness. These themes and factors are presented in their entirety in 
Appendices C and E, respectively, and are referenced and reproduced in part throughout 
this chapter. The implications were then analyzed by focus group and in the aggregate to 
determine what the participants felt were the largest and most important implications 
resulting from changing retirement policy. 
 An analysis of the data presented in Appendix C indicates that nearly all of the 
implications from transitioning from a defined benefit to defined contribution retirement 
system relate to manpower. However, since manpower is a very broad topic, further 
refinement is necessary to effectively analyze the responses in a meaningful way that 
lends itself to the logical conclusions. Analysis of the response data in Table 11 reveals 
the following subcategories as they relate the broader topic of manpower: 
 Recruiting and Retention 
 Pay and other compensation 
 Assignment Detailing 
 Knowledge Loss/Other Factors 
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Summary of Response Data in relation to manpower 
Recruiting and Retention Certain skill sets have more incentive to 
leave. 
Individual MOS doesn’t matter. It’s a 
personal decision and its likely retention 
won’t change much. People that would 
have stayed will stay and those that 
wouldn’t have won’t. 
May have an increase in retention without 
the stigma of a 20 YOS pension. 
Faster promotions 
Pay and other compensation Gives people a chance (or forces them) to 
make a cost/benefit analysis decision. 
Equity among members 
Allows them to leave with something. 
Assignment Detailing Easier to turn down tough jobs and leave 
the service if benefits are transferrable. 
Manpower has to be rethought. 
Potential to lose the most tech savvy 
individuals (E-6/O-3) if they leave rather 
than accept hardship jobs 
Other Factors Force structure would be more junior.   
Fewer mid-grades to senior personnel. 
Better ability to manage the force. 
 
Table 11.   Summary of Response Data in Relation to Manpower 
These four categories capture the majority of the themes and decision factors as 
relayed to the authors from the participants in all six focus groups. Taken together, they 
hint at the significant impact to the force in terms of manpower that DoD faces when 
considering a change of this magnitude with respect to retirement policy. 
D. RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
1. Implications to Retention and Recruitment  
The DBB argues that the current retirement system is inherently unfair. In support 
of this argument they offer the following statistics. Only 17% of the entire force structure 
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receives a retirement benefit.129  Historically only 13% of enlisted personnel and 43% of 
officer personnel receive a pension.130  They go on to assert that 76% of the force that 
does retire transitions between 20 and 25 years of service.131  The DBB plan advocates 
for a removal of the “cliff vesting” requirement to complete 20 years of service. They do 
not offer a specific recommendation of an appropriate vesting period; instead they 
suggest that one approach is to vest personnel after an initial commitment of some length. 
The data in Appendix C suggests that the removal of the 20 YOS requirement has a 
significant impact on recruiting and retention. All six focus groups remarked that removal 
of this requirement would make it far easier to leave at the mid-career point since their 
benefits become portable under a DC plan. Personnel would no longer face the prospect 
of a total loss of retirement benefits under a plan in which they accrue benefits as they 
serve rather than after an arbitrary number of years of service. The DBB touts the 
flexibility and portability of a DC plan as a significant improvement over the current 
system.132  From the board’s perspective, the new plan allows personnel to leave short of 
20 YOS without a loss of all benefits. This satisfies though who argue the “cliff vesting” 
aspect of the current system is unfair. In addition, the risk associated with separation prior 
to 20 YOS is eliminated. From a DoD perspective, this flexibility allows DoD to separate 
personnel to separate at any point after initial vesting without considering how the 
service-member’s benefits are impacted. They would simply transition with benefits 
accrued to date. Furthermore, this new plan provides DoD with a force-shaping tool that 
is less constrained by retirement policy and structure. However, the data collected by the 
focus groups largely contradicts this assertion. A comparison of DBB’s assertion as 




                                                 
129 Ibid., 26 
130 Ibid., 5. 
131 Ibid., 6. 
132 Ibid., 12. 
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Comparison of DBB Data to Focus Group Responses 
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Table 12.   Comparison of DBB data to Focus Group Responses 
The DBB concludes that retirement benefits “have little to no impact on retention 
or recruiting for at least the first ten years of service.”133  The focus group data tends to 
confirm that premise although it indicates 8 YOS as an upper cutoff rather than 10 YOS. 
This is largely due to the loose definitions that defined initial commitment and mid-career 
                                                 
133 Ibid., 25. 
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in terms of YOS completed. 5 of 6 focus groups remarked that the decision process 
within the initial commitment window of up to 8 years does not consider retirement as a 
definitive factor in making a decision to enter or leave military service. The divergence 
between the DBB and the focus group data reveals itself at the mid-career stage. The 
focus group data overwhelmingly supports the premise that mid-career officer personnel 
(O3/O4) would be inclined to leave the service at the mid-career stage. Multiple factors 
were cited as reasons to leave the service at this point. The top reasons cited were: 
 Portability of retirement benefits 
 Age relative to civilian counterparts when starting a second career 
 Marketability/Transferability of job skills 
 Family considerations 
However, all of these reasons were secondary to the idea that the elimination of 
the 20 year vesting requirement provides military personnel the freedom to explore other 
career opportunities outside of military service without the prospect of losing retirement 
benefits. The focus groups were universal in their assertion that DoD underestimates the 
amount of mid-career personnel that continue their service largely due to the limitation 
imposed upon them from “cliff vesting.”  This is compelling considering the 
demographics of the focus group participants. The focus groups consisted of mid-grade 
career minded officers approximately 33 years of age with approximately 13.5 YOS; all 
seeking advanced education funded by the DoD. Furthermore, the DBB notes in its report 
that only 7% of personnel leave the force between 15–20 YOS134. Thus, although the 
DBB touts the flexibility of a DC plan and its ability to help shape the force135, the 
potential for large numbers of accomplished mid-career officers to leave military service 
at a time when they historically leave in miniscule numbers is perhaps an unintended and 
unwanted byproduct of changing retirement policy. 
                                                 
134 Ibid., 11. 
135 Ibid., 29. 
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2. Implications for the Military Pay and Compensation 
Retirement pay is but one part of the military compensation package that exists 
for military personnel. It is the one part of the compensation system that applies equally 
to all personnel. Members accrue benefits at the rate of 2.5% per year with no benefits 
vesting until 20 YOS are completed.136  Variations do exist with respect to how benefits 
accrue and the payout structure depending upon whether the member opts for the 
REDUX option, but the base structure is as previously described. The DBB argues that 
the static structure of the current military retirement system does not adequately address 
or compensate those service members designated as high-risk such as those on combat 
duty or those experiencing some type of hardship.137  Their recommendation for a new 
defined contribution based on the TSP supposedly offers system flexibility in the form of 
adjustments to TSP contributions based on risk factors such as combat duty, hardship 
tours, family separation, etc.138  This assertion runs contrary to the data collected in the 
focus groups. Table 13 shows a summary of the responses received from the six focus 
groups when they were asked about the implications of switching to a defined 
contribution from a pay and other compensation perspective.  
  
                                                 
136 Ibid., 4. 
137 Ibid., 25. 
138 Ibid., 31. 
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Focus Group Response To A Defined Contribution As Related to Pay and Other 
Compensations 
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Table 13.   Focus Group Response to a Defined Contribution as Related to Pay and Other 
Compensation 
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From the table, it is clear that the focus group participants feel strongly that a 
defined contribution system does not provide needed flexibility; instead it further 
complicates an already complex compensation system by introducing extra variables that 
are already addressed via the regular pay and bonus system currently in existence. 
Military personnel serving in hardship tours, hazardous duty tours, or experiencing 
hardship already receive targeted compensation in the form of bonuses and special pays. 
They are free to contribute all or a portion of this compensation to their TSP accounts if 
they so choose. Hence, the data suggests that simply changing to a defined contribution 
plan does not solve the flexibility problem the DBB identifies. This is ostensibly due to 
the fact that a defined contribution benefit is seen as less valuable than the current benefit. 
This is certainly true based on the focus group data collected. As a result, the implication 
to the military compensation system is that to make up for the decreased retirement 
benefit, some other form of compensation must increase in sufficient quantity to make up 
for the perceived shortfall. Assuming this compensation takes on more than one form, 
changes to the current compensation system processes are needed to accommodate 
changes made to the retirement pay portion of the overall system. So, while changing the 
military retirement system obviously changes military retirement pay processes, it also 
may force DoD to change the compensation system as whole based on complexities 
introduced by the defined contribution system. This may be another unintended 
consequence the DoD may need to consider before implementing new retirement policy. 
3. Implications to Assignment Detailing 
At first glance, military assignment detailing seems to have little to no connection 
with military retirement policy, however an analysis of the data collected in the focus 
groups suggests otherwise. Military officers are organized by community or MOS. 
Within each community or MOS, a career path exists which governs the type and length 
of assignments military officers serve. The amount of choice officers have with respect to 
the types of assignments and their locations varies and is largely governed by their 
occupational specialty, specified career path, and the jobs available when an officer is 
ready to move. Military retirement policy has no direct effect on how assignment 
detailing is conducted in any of the military services. However, retirement policy, 
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through its influence on factors that affect voluntary turnover and retention, potentially 
strongly influences how officers interact with the assignment detailing system. 
In order to illustrate how assignment detailing is affected by a change in 
retirement policy, it is first necessary to examine how military personnel perceive the 
current benefit as it compares to the proposed new system. Table 14 shows a comparison 
of the major features of the current and proposed systems and focus group perceptions of 
their retirement benefit under the new plan.   
 
Members Perception of Benefits Based on Comparison of Systems 
Current System Proposed New System 
(DBB) 
Members Perception of 
Benefits 
 Defined benefit 
 Optional additional 
TSP Contribution 
 No risk to pension 
benefit 
 Choice dependent 




16.5% of base 














for all choices 
except G fund 
 Financial risk 
transferred to individual 
under a DC plan. 
 DC % to TSP would have 
to be much large than 
civilian for equivalency 
 Some higher civilian 
employees make more 
than the 16.5%  
contribution suggested 
in the DBB proposal 
Table 14.   Members Perception of Benefits Based on Comparison of Systems 
These perceptions seem to indicate that military personnel perceive the defined 
contribution military benefit to be at best more variable and risky than a defined benefit 
and at worst significantly less valuable. The perceptions regarding variability, risk, and 
decreased value are bolstered by the current structure of the Uniformed Services Military 
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Thrift Savings Program. The TSP offers 10 different investment funds and military 
personnel are able to choose among all 10 for their TSP contributions.139  All of the funds 
except for the G fund that invests in government backed securities carry some risk of 
investment loss.140 However, the safety of the G Fund carries the risk that investments 
may not appreciate to a level at least equal to the benefit available under a defined benefit 
plan. Thus, only the defined benefit plan offers a retirement benefit without any risk. A 
defined contribution plan invested solely in the G fund offers less risk of loss, but 
introduces investment appreciation risk. As a result, based on the data, the perception that 
a defined contribution system offers a reduced retirement benefit seems reasonable. 
Returning to the issue of exactly how assignment detailing is affected by a change 
of this type, it is now necessary to consider how some of the secondary shocks or 
considerations military personnel consider when deciding to stay or leave military 
actually impact the decision-making process. A snapshot of the process under both 
systems is provided in Figures 4 and 5 respectively.   
                                                 
139 Summary of the Thrift Savings Plan, 11. 
140 Ibid., 12. 
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Figure 4.  Assignment Detailing in Relation to Current Model of Retirement  
Following Figure 4, the inputs to the decision are categorized as relatively 
standard. They consist of career progression and prospects, quality of life, family issues, 
and civilian job prospects. After the process is started, a decision is made to continue to 
serve or quit. If the decision is to quit, the retirement/separation process begins. The 
process is characterized by a determination of eligibility for retirement and pension 
benefits. If not eligible for retirement and the officer chooses to separate anyway, 
forfeiture of benefits occurs. If the decision is to continue service, that officer enters the 
assignment detailing process at various points in his career. The inputs to the process 
consist of the member’s desires, available jobs and the same 4 inputs that were present as 
inputs to the initial stay or leave process. Out of this process another stay or leave 
decision is made. If the decision is to stay, the member chooses or accepts the next 
assignment, their career continues and the process concludes. If the decision is to quit, the 
retirement/separation process described above begins. The other line show in the figure is 
labeled reconsideration. This is due to the time lag between when an officer decides to 
 77 
leave and when they actually retire or separate. The process to retire or separate takes 
some time and officers may decide to reconsider their decision to retire or separate for a 
variety of reasons. Some of those may include a change in status with respect to any of 
the initial 4 inputs to the process or a consideration of the enormity of the benefit lost if 
the officer has not completed 20 YOS and is not retirement eligible. So, as previously 
argued earlier in this chapter, the enormity of the benefit often incentivizes officers to 
stay simply to reach retirement eligibility of 20 YOS and claim benefits where absent this 
impediment they would otherwise separate. This decision severely limits their ability to 
turn down assignments they find less desirable and strips them of much of their power 
with respect to the assignment detailing process. 
 
Figure 5.  Assignment Detailing in Relation to Proposed Model of Retirement 
Now consider the process outlined in Figure 5. This figure depicts the process 
under the new proposed plan. Under this process, the initiating event is either the primary 
shock of a change to retirement policy and benefits or any other shock strong enough to 
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initiate the process. These other shocks are potentially numerous and unique to the 
individual officer. These same shocks, which under the old system were secondary, now 
potentially become primary and exert more influence on the decision process. The overall 
process proceeds almost exactly like the process described for Figure 3 with one notable 
exception. In the new system, the 20 YOS requirement for qualification of benefits is 
removed. Officers would still not be able to retire, but they would be able to claim the 
benefits accrued to date, significantly softening the negative financial implications of 
separating. Without the prospect of loss of benefits to consider, it is still possible some 
officers would reconsider separation and continue their careers, but if the jobs offered in 
the assignment detailing process are deemed unsatisfactory, it is conceivably much easier 
to separate and transition into the civilian job market.   
The removal of the negative financial consequences of separating at any point 
after initial commitment, but especially in the mid-career stage significantly reduces the 
leverage assignment detailers have over military officers in the assignment process. As a 
result, it is entirely reasonable to envision a scenario where assignment detailers in 
various officer communities are left with lists of viable military assignments that cannot 
be filled due to their nature. This may be because they involve combat duty, geographic 
separation, or other traits that military officers deem undesirable. The specific type of 
assignment, while important, is not the central issue as hand. Rather, the central issue or 
implication that must be considered is how to persuade military officers to accept the 
same types of assignments if they perceive they will derive a smaller benefit or utility 
from their completion.   This is especially true if the coercive influence embodied by cliff 
vesting of benefits is removed. It can certainly be argued that coercive assignment 
detailing is a sub-optimal method, but it is effective in accomplishing the goal of merely 
filling billets. At the very least, it would be prudent to examine the size and impact of the 
phenomena created by changing the policy to determine whether further incentives to fill 
those assignments need to be created or increased. So, while military retirement policy 
has no direct effect on assignment detailing, its ability to significantly influence factors 
that do directly affects the process cannot be discounted or underemphasized. This is yet 
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another potential implication the DoD must consider before deciding to change existing 
retirement policy. 
4. Implications for Knowledge Loss 
Knowledge loss is another topic which seemingly has only an indirect connection 
or correlation with military retirement policy. However, despite the lack of a direct 
connection, the prospect of an overall decrease in in the tacit or functional knowledge is a 
very real possibility. As discussed in the section on retention and recruiting, military 
retirement policy exhibits no discernible effect on the services’ ability to recruit and 
retain people up to approximately 8–10 YOS. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that 
with few exceptions, officers with that number of YOS have completed their initial 
training and have varying levels of operational experience in their specialty. During this 
initial phase of their careers, military officers are gaining the baseline knowledge and 
operational experience necessary to enable them to fulfill assignments of greater 
responsibility during the mid-career phase of their careers. Thus, the flow of knowledge 
during the early stages of a military officers’ career is primarily from the designated 
service to the service-member in the form of initial technical and operational training. 
This results in no net loss of knowledge on the part of the services. 
As the officers enter the mid-career phase of their careers, they have completed all 
of their initial training and have some level of operational experience. This varies 
according to the occupational specialty chosen, but given that officers have achieved the 
rank of O3 or O4 by the 10-year point in this career, this is a reasonable assumption. 
Recalling the focus group demographic averages of 33 years of age and 13.5 YOS, it 
seems clear that many of the officers in the focus group fit the definition of a mid-career 
officer. These officers are all obtaining advanced education degrees from the Naval 
Postgraduate School, adding to the knowledge level or knowledge base of their 
component services and DoD as a whole. Based on their responses pertaining to retention 
about recruiting as provided in Table 11 and Table 12, it is clear these types of officers 
are precisely the ones who would seek to leave under a DC system. This becomes 
problematic for two primary reasons. First, the services suffer a dilution of officers in the 
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middle portion of their rank structure. This causes a weakening or breakdown of the 
mentor/mentee relationship many of the services rely on for the transfer of operational 
experience between seniors and subordinates. Second, the services rely on the continued 
career progression of these mid-career officers to fulfill the senior positions within their 
respective communities. As they transition from mid-career officers to senior officers, 
they acquire additional knowledge and become the stewards and developers of their 
communities’ programs and policies. An interruption of this process, in the form of a loss 
of significant numbers of mid-career officers, interrupts the acquisition and passage of 
knowledge from seniors to juniors. The resulting force is characterized by a smaller 
number of more experienced senior officers that lack sufficient numbers of mid-career 
personnel to mentor, train, and teach officers during their initial terms of service. Over 
time, as the most senior officers leave the service, core knowledge in the various 
communities dissipates due to a lack of personnel to refresh, refine, and sustain the 
knowledge base in the mid-career ranks. Hence, a seemingly unrelated policy decision 
about retirement has potentially significant impact on how the services and DoD retain 
and transfer knowledge among military personnel. 
E. CONCLUSION 
The analysis of the data in this chapter illustrates some of the many implications 
that result from changing the military retirement system from a pension based system to a 
contributory system.    The broad category of manpower seems to encompass many of the 
implications. This chapter has used the data collected in the focus groups to categorize 
the implications and refine the broader category of manpower into more specific sub-
categories. By analyzing the implications indicated by the data in these smaller categories, 
more specific conclusions about the true impacts DoD must consider before changing a 
policy of this magnitude are able to be developed. As a result, a more informed decision 
can be made with respect to if a change actually needs to be made. Moreover, if a change 
is deemed necessary, an understanding of the implications leads to more detailed and 
better policy decisions regarding design and implementation of the necessary changes. 
This leads to more efficient and less costly changes and the potential for easier adoption 
and acceptance by military personnel. 
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VI. RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
A. OVERVIEW 
The all-volunteer force concept of military service took effect in 1973. President 
Nixon, acting on the recommendations of the Gates Commission formed in 1969, actually 
signed the law in 1971, but induction authority ended in January of 1973.141  Since that 
time, the all-volunteer force concept is credited with the transformation of the military 
service into the youngest, most diverse, most professional fighting force in the history of 
the United States. Bernard Rostker, in his book, I Want You! The Evolution of the All 
Volunteer Force argues that the past, current, and continued future success of the all-
volunteer force depends on four distinct factors:142 
 Attention and Leadership 
 Quantitative Analysis of Policies 
 Recruiting 
 Financial Resources 
Based on the sheer amount of resources DoD expends cultivation these 4 factors, 
it is clear DoD has adopted these principles as the foundation of its human capital 
strategy with respect to the military services. In addition, based on the sheer volume of 
commissions, reviews, reports, and other analysis regarding retirement reform addressing 
these 4 factors, it is clear that any potential change of military retirement policy must 
adequately address each of these factors to merit further consideration.   
 The Defense Business Board’s proposal makes a compelling case regarding for 
changing existing retirement policy. The DBB proposal addresses specific issues 
regarding current and future costs, structural disadvantages, and equality of benefits. 
However, analysis of other manpower related factors such as recruiting and retention is 
largely lacking, and what analysis exists is entirely presented from a DoD perspective. 
                                                 
141 Rostker, Bernard D., “The Evolution of the All Volunteer Force.” In I Want You! The Evolution of 
the All Volunteer Force, by Bernard D. Rostker, 1-5. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 2006. 
142 Ibid., 6. 
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Thus, it seems to not adequately address at least one of the four tenets of DoD’s human 
capital strategy. This may indicate why, even with proposals such as the DBB to consider, 
DoD is still searching for ways to deal with the ever increasing cost of military personnel, 
both active and retired. As recently as November 2012, the Congressional Budget Office 
released a report entitled Costs of Military Pay and Benefits in the Defense Budget 
detailing the projected costs of military retirement and a description of alternate 
retirement proposals and their advantages. 143   As the DoD grapples with potentially 
shrinking budgets, compensation reform, especially retirement compensation will 
continue to be at the forefront of the debate regarding fiscal responsibility and cost 
control. 
The research data collected in this report suggests significant potential 
implications and repercussions exist with respect to manpower that would accompany a 
switch to a defined contribution system. It also captures the attitudes and perceptions of 
military officers regarding the potential reduction of retirement benefits resulting from a 
potential policy change. These implications and attitudes potentially directly affect the 
ability of the DoD to execute its human capital strategy in the future. This chapter 
provides general and specific recommendations to mitigate the potential undesirable or 
unintended consequences associated with implementation of a defined contribution 
system. It also concludes this report with a look back at our original research questions 
and a summary of possible answers. 
B. GENERAL RECOMMENDATIONS 
Department of Defense military retirement policy affects the entire force. As such, 
any discussions or deliberations pertaining to its possible change must encompass both 
agency and personnel viewpoints and perspectives. Just as the composition and structure 
of the armed services are influenced by strategic documents such as the National Security 
Strategy, National Defense Strategy, National Military Strategy, and the Guidance for the 
Employment of the Force; the system designed to compensate military personnel must 
                                                 
143 Congressional Budget Office.  Costs of Military Pay and Benefits in the Defense Budget, 
Washington D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2012, 1-49. 
 83 
also reflect and support those shared ideals. All too often, reports and surveys connected 
to this topic approach this complex and emotionally charged issue with either agency or 
personnel colored lenses. This inability to effectively consider all aspects of the issue 
leads DoD to field incomplete and inflexible solutions that fail to address conceptual, 
structural, and process related problems present in the current retirement system. Thus, 
the first step in crafting meaningful and lasting retirement reform is a clear articulation of 
the desired end-state and flexibility of the system developed after careful consideration of: 
 Applicable laws 
 Constraints (Financial, DoD specific) 
 Agency objectives 
 Stakeholder desires 
Only after a consideration of all the factors involved can a mutually beneficial solution be 
developed. 
To facilitate the development of a comprehensive retirement solution, the DoD 
should consider supplementing the already mandated reviews of military compensation 
with data gathered from military personnel and other stakeholders. Their attitudes or 
perceptions of any proposed changes would be especially useful in deciding if the 
changes are indeed necessary or if the costs outweigh potential savings or benefits. This 
data collection could be combined with existing surveys and exit interviews conducted by 
the individual services at various points throughout the careers of service members. The 
data could then be subdivided by personnel type (officer, enlisted) or job type (combat 
arms, support). Any category that yields the necessary data granularity needed to make an 
informed analysis adds value to the analysis. Additional data analysis ensures the 
opinions and views of military personnel and other stakeholders are considered, 
providing greater transparency to the overall process. After collection and analysis, 
preliminary policy positions should be compared with recommendations advanced by 
various independent research organizations. The DoD would arrive at final positions for 
further submission based on the outcome of the comparison process. Concurrent with the 
development of preliminary positions, the DoD should also perform a feasibility and 
adaptability study of its current military retirement processes to ensure it can 
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accommodate potential changes before a final policy determination is made. Adopting a 
process such as the one outlined ensures that both the DoD and the military personnel 
remain partners in any potential change to retirement policy and that the policy works for 
the benefit of all involved. 
A further recommendation for DoD to consider is the expansion of this study’s 
design and methods to enlisted service members. Although the Unfolding Model seems 
universal in nature, a study of this type for enlisted personnel would serve to confirm this 
premise and the implications from such a study would be useful in understanding the 
similarities and differences in decision processes among various personnel types. This 
may lead DoD to reconsider the notion of a “one size fits all” mentality regarding 
military retirement policy. Indeed, the DBB in its report laments the inflexibility of the 
current system and offers this as one of the primary reasons for suggesting the system 
change. The research data also indicates additional flexibility may indeed be needed to 
accomplish manpower goals if the system is changed. Regardless of the decision the DoD 
and Congress ultimately makes, an additional study of this type would only increase the 
availability of quality information to consider in deliberations. 
Finally, a further expansion of this study should not only consider why people 
leave, as this study attempted to convey with the potential decision making factors and 
potential mitigation techniques, but also why people stay. Thomas Lee and Terence 
Mitchell, the founders of the unfolding model, have also developed a model to answer the 
question of why people stay.   They outline this model in “Why People Stay: using job 
embedment to predict voluntary turnover.” 144   They look at the “overall level of 
embedment” through three dimensions: links, fit, and sacrifice. These dimensions are also 
analyzed in terms of individual organization and within the community. 145  Analysis 
under the job embedment umbrella might provide significant insight as to what might 
                                                 
144 Terence R. Mitchell, Brooks C. Holtom, Thomas W. Lee, Chrhis J. Sablynski, and Miriam Erez, 
“Why People Stay: Using Job Embeddedness to Predict Voluntary Turnover,” Academy of Management 
Journal 44, no.6 (Dec 2001), 1102-1121.  Proquest (199789164). 
145 Ibid., 1104. 
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compel individuals within the military services stay for an entire career under a DC 
system. 
C. SPECIFIC MANPOWER RECOMMENDATIONS  
1. Recruiting and Retention Recommendations  
Any defined contribution system must address the perception of decreased 
benefits and the shift of financial risk from the DoD to the service member. To ensure the 
viability of the all-volunteer structure of the military force, the DoD must take the 
necessary steps to empower the services to recruit and retain sufficient forces in both 
quality and number. This calls for a compensation package that compares favorably to 
equivalent civilian employment and also addresses the unique sacrifices that military 
personnel make both financially and otherwise to begin or continue military service. 
Hence, any retirement proposal, whether defined benefit, defined contribution, or a 
hybrid of the two must consider the employment opportunities available to military 
officers in the civilian workplace while acknowledging the uniqueness of military service.  
Specific recruiting and retention incentives are difficult to formulate due to a 
variety of factors. These factors include age, physical ability, mental ability, language 
skills, service culture, etc. The individual services, under the umbrella of established DoD 
policy, are best equipped to decide what tools are needed to recruit and retain the people 
needed to complete the variety of missions undertaken. However, by looking at the 
current amounts and types of compensation that are available currently and combining 
them with some of the components of proposed DC plans, some generic 
recommendations can be made. First, for those officer communities currently receiving 
bonuses for career milestone accomplishments, one option is to alter the payout structure 
of the bonus for additional service. For example, the Navy offers Surface Warfare 
Officers at the O-4 rank the Surface Warfare Officer Critical Skills Bonus. It pays 
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eligible officers $46,000 to serve through 15 YOS.146  The payout is according to the 
following schedule: 
 $22,000 at the 2nd anniversary of promotion to O-4 
 $12,000 at the 3rd anniversary of promotion to O-4 
 $12,000 at the 4th anniversary of promotion to O-4 
The bonus payout structure or amount could conceivably be changed to incentivize an 
officer to make an increased YOS commitment. This could be accomplished by agreeing 
to pay the bonus in a lump sum if the officer agrees to a longer term of service or 
commits the entirety of the bonus directly to his TSP account. The benefit of a proposal 
such as this is twofold. The service potentially gains an increased service commitment for 
essentially the same amount of money it was already willing to pay and the officer 
benefits from a large contribution to his or her TSP account that has a longer time period 
to accumulate additional earnings. A plan such as this conceivably increases costs by 
forcing the service to pay bonuses in lump sums, but that is potentially mitigated by a 
more stable force structure among the demographic group the research data suggests 
would be inclined to leave under the new DC plan. The DoD should query the other 
services to look at other bonuses of this type and consider if similar proposals are 
appropriate to meet their goals. For recruiting, both the DBB and the research data 
indicates that consideration of retirement benefits bears little on the decision to enter the 
military or continue service up to the mid-career point at approximately 10 YOS. Thus, 
no specific recommendation is needed here. The individual services simply need to 
monitor their existing accession goals to determine if other measures are required. 
Current measures such as accelerated initial service bonuses or advanced training 
opportunity guarantees can be used to target communities experiencing personnel 
shortages.   
While bonuses and other special pays have played a key role in retaining 
individuals during time of conflict, money is not always needed to solve retention issues. 
                                                 
146 Navy Personnel Command. “Surface Warfare Officer Critical Skills Bonus”, Department of the 
Navy, http://www.public.navy.mil/bupers-npc/officer/Detailing/surfacewarfare/pay/Pages/SWOCS.aspx. 
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DoD should look at non-monetary factors such as homesteading, duty station choice, 
educational opportunities, or quality of life initiatives to mitigate potential loss of 
personnel. Measures such as these are not monetary in terms of DoD paying the member, 
they do have value in potentially saving DoD money while offering another recruiting 
and retention inducement. These were discussed and brought up by all the focus groups 
and could potentially provide a means to help shape and mold the force for the future.   
2. Pay and Other Compensation Recommendations 
Building upon the recruiting and retention recommendations, the proposal to 
mitigate some of the negative consequences regarding pay and other compensation are 
similar. The DoD should instruct the services to identify and prioritize the various officer 
communities that are undermanned or critical to the success of their mission. They 
already do this to a large extent in various communities such as Aviation, Submarine, 
Special Forces, Medical officers, and others. One look at the Special and Incentive Pay 
section of the Defense Finance and Accounting Service’s website shows a multitude of 
special pays available for the different officer communities.147  This strongly suggests 
that additional financial inducements are often necessary to maintain sufficient levels of 
personnel with advanced skills as they progress through their careers. This problem is 
potentially exacerbated with the switch to a DC plan due to removal of the immediate 
lifetime annuity at 20 YOS. Without the lifetime annuity available immediately upon 
retirement, it is likely retiring service members will need to find civilian employment to 
bridge the gap between military retirement and availability of benefits under a DC plan. 
To deal with the impending shortfall, it is reasonable to expect that military personnel 
may demand higher levels of current compensation throughout their military careers to 
enable them to increase their retirement benefit and provide for potential increased levels 
of non-retirement savings capable of reducing financial risk. Hence, the recommendation 
for the DoD is to consider the sufficiency and flexibility of current special pay and 
current regular military pay systems in meeting this new demand. This enables the DoD 
                                                 
147 Defense Finance and Accounting Service.  “Special and Incentive Pays” Department of Defense, 
http://www.dfas.mil/militarymembers/payentitlements/specialpay.html. 
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to provide Congressional leadership with well thought out proposals to consider should 
the need to reform regular military compensation arise.   
Further recommendations regarding pay and compensation revolve around service 
members’ knowledge and understanding of all of the various forms of compensation to 
which they may be entitled. As noted early on in Chapter 3 of our report, DLI rejected 
our request to speak to their enlisted students as part of our research. They cited the 
students’ youth and lack of knowledge about military retirement as one of the primary 
reasons the request was denied. While we certainly respect the authority of the IRB at 
DLI to reject our request, we could not disagree more with the cited reasons for the denial 
of the request. Ignorance about compensation in general, but particularly retirement 
compensation, is behind many of the misconceptions that exist about military retirement. 
In addition, as the DBB notes and the research data confirms, younger military personnel 
tend not to consider the impact of military compensation on their overall career and 
financial goals during the initial service commitment. This argument is further bolstered 
by Todd Harrison of the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) in his 
report Rebalancing Military Compensation: An Evidence Based Approach. Harrison 
notes in its report that over 80% of respondents in 4 different age groups among a sample 
size of 2600 would be willing to delay retirement to age 50 for an additional 1% increase 
in current pay.148  Given that Harrison calculated an average retirement age for officers 
of 47, the potential is there for an officer to forfeit up to 3 years of benefits for less than 
$1000.00 annually in most cases.149  Reports such as this show that personnel perform 
incomplete evaluations of the impacts potential changes to retirement policy can have on 
their long-term financial goals. As such, the DoD should institute a mandatory training 
program centered on educating military personnel about the value and importance of their 
retirement benefits. This education program should encompass both officer and enlisted 
personnel and should be repeated either at career milestones or YOS gates to ensure 
members are able to make the most informed decision possible about their benefits. An 
                                                 
148 Harrison, Todd. Rebalancing Military Compensation: An Evidence Based Approach 
149 Ibid., 49. 
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educational program of this type would decrease the number of bad or questionable 
financial decisions made by younger military personnel due to their ignorance of military 
retirement policy. It would also allow for a frank and open discussion about the impact of 
changes to policy without the uniformed emotional debate that often accompanies such 
policy discussions.   The final and perhaps most important benefit DoD would gain from 
a program of this type is the perception that an informed personnel base is important even 
if it results in attrition once all alternatives are considered. 
3. Recommendations for Assignment Detailing 
Since there seems to be no direct connection between military retirement policy 
and assignment detailing, there are no specific policy recommendations. Recalling 
Figures 3 and 4 from Chapter 5, it is clear that numerous triggers or events may start the 
process that ultimately affects assignment detailing. Since these triggers are largely 
unique to the service member, it is impossible to predict what triggers or events require 
planning to mitigate. Therefore, the individual services just need to continue to evaluate 
their personnel assignment process for any indications of additional difficulties filling 
hardship, hazardous duty, or combat assignments. Should difficulties increase, the 
services would need to act quickly to determine the root causes and implement plans to 
mitigate them. They may take the form of additional bonuses to supplement regular or 
retirement compensation. They could also consider offering follow-on job assignment 
guarantees, choice of geographical location or other benefits based on root cause 
identification. It might also help to highlight the transferability of skills learned in the 
assignment to potential future assignments either in or out of military service. Ultimately, 
each service would take responsibility for deciding how to mitigate and counteract any 
negative impacts to assignment detailing. The severity of the problem and its causes 
would dictate the size and scope of the responses necessary. However, this may be 
difficult to assess due to a lack of a direct causal relationship between retirement policy 
and the assignment detailing process. 
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D. CONCLUSIONS 
Even without the added pressure of shrinking defense budgets and possible 
sequestration, any discussion of changing or reducing military retirement benefits would 
be met with stiff resistance. That the discussion is happening in a time and environment 
of great uncertainty only adds to the uneasiness of such discussions. The nation is 
transitioning from a constant period of war and conflict. These wars have stressed 
defense budgets and military personnel in ways unimaginable little more than a decade 
ago. As the military transitions, an opportunity exists for the DoD and the various 
services to reshape themselves with a structure  that sustains the force in the short term 
and secures its long term fiscal health while still providing the necessary military strength 
to confront and defeat all threats. One of the fundamental questions the military must 
consistently answer is:  
 How do we recruit and retain the necessary forces to meet the 
nation’s needs? 
 How do we compensate those who choose to serve a career in the 
military as they transition into retirement? 
These two questions taken in combination with the abundance of studies both internal 
and external to the DoD calling for retirement policy change led to the  primary research 
questions forming the basis of this report: 
 How would adoption of a defined contribution retirement system 
change the decision-making process to stay or leave? 
 What are the implications to the military services associated with 
adoption of a defined contribution military retirement system? 
 What organizational policies are necessary to mitigate the risks of 
associated with changing DoD retirement policy? 
The answers to these questions are vital because if DoD and the military services fail to 
adequately predict and mitigate risk with respect to their Human Capital strategy, the 
viability of the all-volunteer military force could be at risk. 
The DBB proposals certainly provide a way for DoD to fiscally sustain the 
military retirement system. However, a fiscally solvent system absent of at least tacit 
acceptance and approval by military personnel is no better than a fiscally unsustainable 
system with broad military personnel acceptance. Either extreme system provides for a 
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sub-optimal force in both number and quality. As a result, any proposal must strike the 
delicate balance of compensating military personnel for the risks they incur serving their 
country while remaining fiscally sustainable over the long-term. Otherwise, the force that 
results is not capable of meeting the nation’s security challenges. 
Having reviewed and analyzed the data collected throughout the research process, 
it is clear that an adoption of a defined contribution system would necessitate a 
fundamental re-examination of the manpower systems of the DoD and its component 
military services. The removal of several bedrock principles of the current retirement 
system such as the 20-year vesting requirement and the lifetime annuity at 20 YOS 
introduce a level of variability and risk into a system that has served the nations needs 
since 1949. This type of change fundamentally alters the perceptions regarding the value 
of military retirement benefits and the value of a career in the armed services. These new 
value judgments combined with the elimination of career switching costs potentially 
impact every existing policy with respect to how DoD and the services, recruit, retain, 
pay, and assign military personnel.  
To mitigate the risks associated with changing to a DC plan, the DoD and the 
services will need manpower policies that are as agile and flexible as the military 
personnel they serve. The policies and the systems that support them will require constant 
re-evaluation and updating to ensure they continue to support the objectives of the DoD 
and the services, but also the military personnel. No longer will the DoD be able to make 
decisions in a vacuum and take the “wait and see” approach with respect to manpower 
and personnel management that characterize many of the retirement policy decisions of 
the past. A defined contribution retirement system makes the employment environment 
for military officers significantly more fluid. Any system supporting that environment 
will need to be equally fluid. 
To ensure DoD has a complete retirement policy solution, several other factors 
outside of the scope of this report must be considered. As stated previously, this report 
did not obtain data from enlisted military personnel. Obviously any comprehensive policy 
must address this group.   Data needs to be collected and compared to determine the 
similarities and differences between the data presented in this report. Analyzing the data 
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for enlisted personnel provides DoD a complete picture of the total manpower situation. 
Building upon this, DoD decision-makers will be better able to evaluate the tradeoff 
between a potential exodus of mid-career personnel and the ability to retain possibly a 
smaller number of longer term career personnel resulting from a new policy. In addition, 
the triggers and shocks that begin the process leading to one of the seven paths of the 
Unfolding model require further analysis to develop mitigation or avoidance strategies. 
These strategies potentially reduce sub-optimal outcomes of the decision-making process. 
This leads to an analysis of alternative incentives or an incentive structure that may be 
necessary to deal with or counter many of the implications detailed in this report. 
DoD has significant choices with respect to how to best structure a defined 
contribution retirement system. However, any choice made must consider both the 
service and the service member. The military personnel decision-making process and the 
perceptions regarding the value of military retirement must be part of the equation or the 
resulting system cannot succeed. As success is defined as the continued viability of the 
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Source:  Defense Business Board, “Modernizing the Military Retirement System,” (Report, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Washington, D.C., 
July 21, 2011): 8. http://dbb.defense.gov/reports2011.shtml.
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APPENDIX B. FOCUS GROUP MEMBERS DATA 
 
19-Oct Fri 22-Oct Mon
Service Rank Age YOS Service Rank Age YOS
1 Navy Lt 31 9.5 1 Navy LCdr 38 15.5
2 USMC Capt 35 17 2 Navy LCdr 35 13
3 Army Capt (O-3) 30 8 3 USMC Capt (O3E) 35 15.5
4 Army Maj (O-4) 38 15 4 Navy Cdr (0-5) 39 18
5 Navy LCdr (O-4) 34 12 5 USMC Capt (O3E) 32 14
6 Navy Lt (O-3) 32 10 6
7 USMC Capt (O-3) 35 11.5 7
8 Navy LCdr (O-4) 42 23 8
34.5 11.8 35 15.5
34.6 13.3 35.8 15.2
23-Oct Mon 23-Oct Mon
Service Rank Age YOS Service Rank Age YOS
1  Navy LCdr (O-4) 35 11 1  Navy LCdr (O-4) 36 11
2 USMC Capt (O-3) 33 13 2 Air Force Capt (O-3) 8
3 USMC Capt (O3E) 33 15 3 Navy Lt (O-3) 36 11
4 Army LTC (O-5) 40 18 4 USMC Capt (O-3) 32 14
5 USCG CDR (0-5) 42 24 5  Navy LCdr (O-4) 33 12
6 USCG LT (O-3) 30 12 6 USMC Capt (O-3) 26 5
7 7 USMC Maj (O-4) 35 12
8 8 Air Force Capt (O-3) 29 5
9 USMC Capt (O-3) 7
34 14 33 11
35.5 15.5 32.4 9.8
23-Oct Mon 23-Oct Mon
Service Rank Age YOS Service Rank Age YOS
1  Navy LCdr (O-4) 36 17 1 USMC Maj (O-4) 35 12
2 Navy Lt (O-3) 34 15 2 USMC Capt (O-3E) 36 18
3 USMC Capt (O-3) 32 11 3 USMC Maj (O-4) 39 14
4 USMC Capt (O-3) 30 12 4 USMC Capt (O-3) 37 16
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APPENDIX C. FOCUS GROUP RAW DATA OF 
POSTIVE/NEGATIVE IMPLICATIONS AND MITIGATIONS 
 
  
Question:  What are the potential implications from adoption of a Defined Contribution system.
Question:  How do we mitigate those impacts?
3.  Allows them to leave with something.
Focus Group 1
1.  Make the choice on retirement 
option at 2nd term point.  2nd term 
would be longer.
2.  Low benefits for personnel with <20 
YOS.  Help to get rid of the DWL.
1.  Promotes people who can't get job 
outside to stay longer…the non-leaders 
just collecting a paycheck.
2.  Already hard to retain personnel in 
the Navy even with the 20 year vesting 
pension.
1.  Might help people stay past 20 years.  
For instance wife would inherit TSP upon 
death plus get SGLI.
2.  Would want to stay in longer with the 
DC.  No forcing incentive to get out.
Positive Negative Mitigating Techniques
3.  Vest after the 1st term.  Must complete 
first term to receive it.
4.  Increase size of retention bonuses
5.  Comprehensive retirement campaign to 
distribute the knowledge of the 
retirement system.
6.  Longer Tours
6.  Help increase retention - the 20 year 
vesting pension isn't influencing the 
decision to join or leave. 6.  Junior service members don't think 
about retirement so don't plan to save 
enough.  Very bad with TSP.
7.  Cultures
8.  Tier system by contribution system over 
time or better to use the compensation 
system.
10.  Give choices
12.  More favorable tax implications for 
WDL of 401K if get out.
13.  Must retain people longer in same 
grade (Navy)
7.  Some higher civilian employees make 
more than the 16.5% suggested in the 
DBB proposal.
8.  Lifestyle - work/combat.  These are 
hard to get over when making decisions 
to stay/quit.
9.  Current bonuses aren' t really used 
for retention.  They are used to make 
RMC = Civilian Pay.
4.  Age matters for some skill sets / Jobs
10.  No incentive to stay anymore.
12.  Diluton of HC
13  Gap in E-5 to E-6 ranks in Navy (Shop 
supervisors/Skilled Workers):  decrease 
in material readiness.  Might increase 
with DC.
14.  Promoting too fast - not enough 
knowledge in certain ranks (Chief)
15.  Unique knowledge told through 
stories from Higher ranks…increased 
tacit knowledge
4.  Gives people a chance (or forces 
them) to make a cost/benefit analysis 
decision.
5.  Better force management
3.  Certain skill sets have more incentive 
to leave.
5.  People who decide to serve will 
migrate toward the higher paying jobs 
within the military.
11. Youth and vigor needed in the 
Marine Corps.
20.  Have to ge the manning process 
precise
9.  Gate Pays
10.  Change the term strucutre by 
MOS/Specialty 
11.  Provide opportunity to change 
16.  Increase in KL.  
17.  Need Experience
18.  Can't tie the retirement system to 
this.




5.  More freedom for the individual to 
get out
8.  Individual MOS doesn't matter.  It's a 
personal decision and it's likely 
retention won't change much.  People 
that would have stayed will stay and 
those that wouldn't have won't.
10.  A more junior force strucutre could 
potentially increae the level of 
knowledge in those grades and provide 
for a better pool of people to promote 
from.
6.  Decrease in knowledge especially in 
the Senior Leadership
2.  Would still remain if decrease benefit 
to 40%, and get higher distribution in 
the future.  (Not sure if this would 
actually decrease costs)
3.  Allows for a more direct comparison 
w/civilian benefits.
6.  Shifts financial risk to the individual.
5.  No incentive to stay (the hook to 
remain is the pension at 20 years).
1.  Decrease in costs potentially.
4.  Decisions will be based on what 
service the member is in…love of the 
service.
4.  Matching must be definitive.
5.  Overtime
1.  Older retirement systems are still in 
the minds of the current generation of 
servicemen.  So they would have an 
influence on the new enlistees and 
possible pose a negative tone of any 
new system.
2.  Shouldn't be civilian like.  We aren't a 
civilian institution.
9.  Junior guys aren't worried about it.
7.  Better ability to manage the force.
Focus Group 2
Positive Negative Mitigating Techniques
7.  The bonus getters are the same folks 
that would tend to leave early as they 
have the skills we'll need.
8.  Force structure would be more junior.  
Less mid-grade to senior personnel.
1.  Might not be about money.  Might need 
to use other factors.
2.  Career progression bonus must be 
stable / codified in writing.
3.  Option to choose where the bonus goes 
(straight to TSP or to the individual).
9.  Quality of leadership would decrease.
6.  Quality of life must increase in order to 
get people to stay.
7.  Same duty station (PCA v. PCS) and 
longer tours.
8.  Needs to be 100% match with no cap on 
the contributions.
9.  Must hook senior personnel to want to 
stay.
10.  Increase quality of life.
10.  The current generation of 
personnel, those who are looking for 
the pension at 20 YOS, are biased in our 
opinions.  In other words it is hard to 
decouple the idea of not having a 
pension and try to make decision as if 
that was never part of the stay/leave 
3.  Bad for the detailers - they would 
have to be very good salesman.
4.  hard to manage the change to a new 
system.  Will have to rework the 
personnel model (when is the new 




Positive Negative Mitigating Techniques
1.  Equivalent contributions for all 
members
2.  Choice:  begin with a DC plan.  At some 
point the member has the choice to 
transition to a DB after so many years of 
service.
2.  May have an increase in retention 
without the stigma of a 20 YOS pension.
2.  The benefits at 20 YOS are a big carrot 
keeping people in until 20 YOS.
4.  Allow entrance in at O-4 for certain 
support billets (Disbursing/Comptroller).
3.  Longer tour lengths.
Focus Group 3
3.  Navy Supply Corps - if senior O-3/O-4 
are prior enlisted so would a DC take 
away that desire to leave at 20 YOS?
1.  Allows choice of saving or not.   Risky 
investments or not.
1.  Potentially members would leave 
service with not enough money for 
retirement.  The incentive wouldn't be 
there to save if contributions come 
directly from DoD.  Maybe increase 
compensation and make it a matching 
system vice just the service 
9.  Tuition assitance (T/A) and other 
educational opportunities: maybe these 
would need to have tour lengths 
associated with them.
10.  Decrease in the level of HC.  Not 
enough in the mid-career range
10.  CG - Longer tours for senior personnel.  
Need to have the right job.
11.  Surgeons skills and CG Port Safety 
skills are very transferrable to the 
civilian sector so they will be easier to 
lose without the 
6.  For some people the promotion 
opportunities at 18/19 YOS isn't enough 
to hold them in after 20 YOS.
7.  Seniority yields less choice so 
motivated to get out without the 
8.  Get rid of retirement as a factor in the 
decision making process.  Members 
would not be held hostage to it.  Not 
slave to retirement.  Increases members 
ability to choose.
4.  Increase in experience after initial 
enlistment.  More HC as there is a likely 
chance that initial enlistees will stay 
longer.
9.  Navy - early promotions at senior O-3 
and O-4 levels yield not enough HC in 
those ranks.
3.  Easier to get rid of the non-
performers.
5.  There is a difference between combat 
arms and support specialties.
6.  Revision of up or out policies.4.  Lose the best people / only the not so 
talented people will stay. 7.  CG - Longer tours for senior personnel.  
Need to have the right job.5.  Navy Supply Corps - many senior O-
3/O-4's leave early in the career due to 
large number of prior enlisted








4.  Base performance on MOS progression - 
lead to more retirement
8.  Use compensation system - closest to 
the decision maker.
4.  Can ask do I want people to stay until 
20?
4.  Financial risk transferred to 
individual.
6.  Can't leave if economy is bad 
(individual)
7.  Is it right that the service is 
completely cutting ties with the 
members?  What do we swear an oath 
to?  Officers handbook?
Positive Negative Mitigating Techniques
1.  Ties % contribution to 
performance/promotion
2.  More opportunities for command - ties 
into performance/promotion above.
1.  Faster promotions
2.  Better force management
3.  Incentivize stellar performars to stay
5.  Equity among members
6.  Retention better in bad economy
6.  Targeted incentives.
7.  Need flexibility to target needs
3.  There must be more opportunities.
5.  Increase in cash incentives.
5.  Manpower needs to change.
1.  Little to keep people in.
2.  Stellar performers may leave
3.  Difficult to plan retirement
8.  AF/Navy are more technical - need to 
retain
9.  Would have less knowledgeable 
people
11.  Many can wait to get training and 
then get out.  (Then the HC doesn't 
increase in the service as the talent 
10.  Potential to lose the most tech savvy 
individuals (E-6/O-3)
     -directly related to next job.
4.  More educational type opportunities
 -Adjust timeline of bonus pay.
 -Bonus for leadership levels
 -bigger pay raises / higher DC rate
      -promotion/Rank
1.  Longer tour lengths / Homesteading.
2.  Can give more significant bonuses
3.  Need new system for mid-career point:
     -improve performance/evaluation 
system
     -need to lengthen the payback 
commitments
9.  Financial risk to member - must think 
about it.
Positive Negative Mitigating Techniques
1.  Knowledge base gets cut the most 
with the senior leadership 
3.  Civilian comparable jobs could be hit 
the worst.
Focus Group 5
1.  Easier to let people go.
2.  MOS Dependent
2.  Encourages those sticking around for 
extra benefits to get out as there isn't an 
incentive to stay around anymore.
3.  Easier for service to manage the 
force. 4.  Dependent on mitigating factors.
7.  Our health care sucks.
8.  Life insurance goes away.
6.  Manpower needs to be more flexible.
5.  Need more control over career path
     -Education tied to promotion.
4.  More educational opportunities lead 
to increased HC and a better/smarter 
force.
6.  Local management needs power to 
truly evaluate personnel.
5.  Thinking about retirement is forced 
on people.  They must save or not have 
enough money in retirement years.
10.  Combat arms should get paid more - 
but skills don't necessarily transfer 
(unequitable)
5.  Contractors will be sweeping people




6.  Different term structures.
5.  Lock-in for critical MOS's
Focus Group 6
Positive Negative Mitigating Techniques
3.  Need payoff to be farther out for 
younger personnel (combat/lousy jobs)
3.  Easier to show the non-performers 
the door.
Need performers, middlemen, and 
laborers.
4.  DC % would have to be much large than 
civilian
4.  They will also naturally leave earlier.
2.  Non-Performers can leave earlier.
1.  Freedom to move (Ind)
4.  Manpower unstable.
6.  People leave at the midcareer.
10.  Negative impact on recruiting
12.  Manpower has to be rethought.
2.  Pay bonuses more often
1.  Increase bonuses - more money.
7.  Many skills aren't readily 
transferrable (individual)
8.  Many skills are (Pilot, Nuclear, 
communications, intel, medical,…)
9.  Many will look at the military like the 
civilian job market and try to snatch 
people up (Comm, defense industry)
11.  Will have to offer too many 
incentives - system would get out of 
hand and hard to manage.
13.  TSP based on market - can't count on 
it like the pension.
3.  Not a drastic change in knowledge 
base - The institutions will remain and 
contain much of the culture/knowledge.  
The corps of the service.
2.  Timing of implementation needs to 
be thougth through.
1.  Decrease in knowledge base - 
especially in the tougher (more 
physically taxing) MOS's
5.  Skills do transfer.  It's a mindset - 
there are many intangibles that we 
acquire, and experience in 
management.
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APPENDIX D. DECISION-MAKING FACTORS  
 
  
1 Medical Benefits / Healthcare 4
2 Bonuses 1
3 Quality of Life 4






5 Family Life 5
 -Stability of life
 -Not moving so much
 -Wife career track
 -Geographic Stability
 -Family support during deployment
6 Educational Opportunities 2
 -GI Bill turnover to children
7 Civilian Job Market 4
 -outside Employment
 -Comparable Civilian Salary
8 Job Satisfaction 2
 -Duty / Call to Service
 -Desire to serve
 -Deployment Tempo
 -PCS  Moves
 -Comraderie
9 Current compensation 3
 -Non-Cash Benefits
 -Tax Benefits
 -Real Military Compensation (RMC)
10 Retirement
11 Job Security 1
12 Age 2
Factor #
 -Service member (do I want to start a 
new career/can I start a new career)
 -Children (do I want to keep moving 
them)
 -Don't want to do the grunt work 
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